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Somalia is a war-torn country which has been perceived as a security problem threatening not 
only the security of its own population, but also regional and international security. This 
thesis studies five international actors and their engagement in Somalia. Their perspectives on 
security are explored and the coherence in their policies is discussed. The actors chosen for 
the study are the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), the United States, the 
European Union (EU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).  
The thesis argues that actors’ security perspectives are similar. To a large extent, they pursue 
the same goals inside Somalia, they give significance to the employment of the same 
measures, and in this process they secure the same referent objects. Actors are united in their 
support to institution building, and their policies seem centred on securing the state. However, 
in spite of having similar perspectives, they do not seem able to develop coherent policies. 
This is especially evident when looking at the AU and UN strategic reviews which both 
reflect on future missions in Somalia without coming up with a joint suggestion for the future, 
or a solution to current challenges for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). One 
important reason for this is that actors’ self-interests prove decisive when burdens are to be 
shared. Although numerous coordinating bodies have been established, actors are unsatisfied 
with the results. From a more critical perspective, it is also possible to argue that coherence 
will be lacking as long as the Somalis are not provided with sufficient ‘local ownership’.  
The thesis uses theory from security studies as a basis for posing the research question. When 
exploring the answer I draw upon various theories which can inform the study; theory on state 
building, peace building and theory of change. To answer the research question, key 
informants were interviewed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and in Nairobi, Kenya. Literature, in 
the form of official documents, mission descriptions, news articles and former research, has 




The Somali territory lay to the east during the entire flight from Nairobi to Addis Ababa. Ten 
minutes before we landed on Ethiopian soil, the man in the seat next to me asked me what 
business I had in Addis. I answered that I was working on a thesis about international 
engagement in Somalia. 
“I used to work in Somalia, for the UN,” he said. 
Startled to learn that I had spent the last hour and a half sitting next to a person with first-hand 
knowledge, I quickly asked what he thought about the UN’s engagement. He replied: 
“Cynics are former idealists. If the UN had actually followed its strategic objectives, and its 
plans, we would have a different situation today.” When I asked why this was not the case, he 
shrugged his shoulders and said that the big stakeholders have their interests and that this 
becomes the decisive factor. On a rather sombre note he added; 
“If people really knew how the system worked, I would be out of a job.” 
Then the doors opened, and the man continued to transit. 
Working on this thesis has been an experience in appreciating the value of comprehending the 
views of others. I am most grateful to all informants who took the time to meet me during my 
three-week stay in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. Their hospitality and genuine interest in 
communicating their views has been an extraordinary help for me when working on this 
thesis. I want to thank my supervisor Karin Dokken for all her reflections and advice, and her 
genuine support throughout the process. Further, I would like to thank the staff at the 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); in particular, my thanks go to Nina 
Græger and Tore Bjørgo for giving me the opportunity to benefit from NUPI’s resources, to 
Francesco Strazzari and Susan Høivik for all useful comments, and to Cedric de Coning for 
providing contacts in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. I would also like to thank the foundation Fritt 
Ord for providing funding for my fieldwork, and my excellent fellow students Emilie Oftedal 
and Maren Maal for five years of challenging academic discussions and deep friendship. 
Lastly, I am extremely grateful to my supportive family and friends, and my boyfriend 
Thomas, who always told me ‘T’inquètes pas, tu vas réussir’. While it is good to be rational, 
a bit of idealism can sometimes help. 
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Unless the international community can resolve the problem of Somalia,  
they cannot achieve their own security interests (Informant G 22.01.2013).  
Somalis see too much interference from the international community  
as a destabilizing factor (Informant A 15.01.2013). 
This thesis examines policies directed toward what has been considered the failed state of the 
world, Somalia. Instead of focusing solely on the problems of the country itself, I will draw 
attention to the various actors who have effectuated security-political measures towards 
Somalia, compare their perspectives on security and discuss the coherence in their policies.  
The Horn of Africa, consisting of Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya and Sudan, has 
for years been subject to internal conflicts, instability and insurgency movements (Mesfin 
2011:3-4). After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the region received new international attention 
as it was feared that especially Somalia with its lack of government structure could be used as 
a safe haven by terrorist groups. More recently, the Somali insurgency group al Shabaab 
(‘youth’) has been put on the US list of terrorist groups (Landinfo 2012:2). This group has 
carried out attacks not only within the country, but also elsewhere in the region, Kenya in 
particular. Moreover, the group has proclaimed its allegiance to al-Qaida. Thus, Somalia has 
become a security concern stretching over national, regional and international dimensions. 
The terrorist threat, together with concerns about piracy and the general instability in the 
country, has led a wide range of actors to direct their policies towards Somalia.  
These actors are situated at various levels in the international system. National, regional, 
continental and international players are involved, each with a specific culture and history. 
The point of departure in this thesis is an interest in what kinds of synergies this creates. 
1.1 Research question 
After the Cold War, the frame of what is considered ‘security matters’ has been significantly 
expanded. The changes relate to what one should secure, from what the subject should be 
secured and how this is to be done (Buzan et al. 1998:36, Collins 2010:2). In this thesis, this is 
conceptualized as a security perspective. In light of the literature (ibid), a security perspective 
is defined as an actor’s view on what constitutes a threat to security, what the principal object 
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to be secured is, and by which measures it is to be secured. Thus, actors project a security 
perspective through the policies they develop.  
The traditional perspective was that the state should be secured against attack from another 
state actor through military defence (Collins 2010:2). In the concept of human security, the 
referent object of security policies was changed, and the people became the object to be 
secured, not the state as such (ibid). Concepts of state security and human security might be 
regarded as two ideal forms of security perspectives. A broad debate on security has evolved, 
highlighting also other concepts of security such as economic security, food security and 
regime security (Collins 2010:2-10). When a range of actors are involved in policymaking 
towards the same country, it becomes interesting to analyse whether their measures are based 
on similar security perspectives, and whether this has implications for policy coherence. 
‘Coherence’ is here defined as a situation where actors operate and develop policies so that 
efforts pull in the same direction. 
The research question in this thesis has two parts. First: To which extent do international 
actors involved in Somalia have similar security perspectives? And secondly: What are the 
main challenges in achieving a coherent international policy towards Somalia? 
There are several reasons for asking these questions. The first question can be seen as a 
contribution to the academic debate within the discipline of security studies on what it is that 
actors choose to secure. Also the second question is of interest in academic terms, as it seeks 
to explain the principal factors that challenge coherence. When the thesis asks these two 
questions together, it is because it is considered relevant to analyse whether differences or 
similarities in actors’ perspectives has an influence on policy coherence. A finding where 
differences in actors’ perspectives lead to a lack of policy coherence would be in line with 
constructivist perceptions of international relations where ideas and actors’ views of the world 
are accorded considerable weight (see Wendt 1999:135-136). However, this thesis does not 
predict a specific causality between the findings in the two questions. The argument is rather 
that it is relevant to study these two questions together, as this can inform the research of 
security studies, by shedding light on the importance of differing or similar security 
perspectives among actors. In this way, the thesis seeks to explore new ground.  
To answer the research question the concepts ‘security perspective’ and ‘coherence’ are 
operationalized in chapter four. However, to be able to answer the first part of the research 
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question it is also necessary to consider how security perspectives are formed – especially 
within complex organizations. This is discussed in section 3.1, which explains the theory 
foundations of the thesis.  
1.2 Delimitations, method and scope  
Time constraints made it necessary to narrow down the selection of actors in the study, and 
the aspects in relation to which they are analysed. The choice of actors is presented below. 
But first, this section will briefly reflect on important areas that fall outside the scope of this 
research.  
The thesis studies the engagement of international actors in a country which itself has a range 
of interesting actors, most notably in the form of clans and regions which have obtained a 
degree of autonomy from south-central Somalia and the capital Mogadishu. The stories of 
Puntland and Somaliland, and the significance of clan politics in Somali society, are indeed 
fascinating subjects to study, but they are not given primary importance in this thesis – simply 
because this research centres on the engagement of international actors. That said, the study is 
by no means detached from the local context. Although the focus is on international actors, 
the analysis includes evaluations of whether their policies are locally attached or based on 
‘local ownership’. As chapter three will show, local attachment can be considered of primary 
importance both when evaluating actors’ measures, and when evaluating policy coherence. 
Moreover, the thesis studies policies and engagement directed towards Somalia only. This is 
an important delimitation, as the Horn of Africa in many ways can be considered a regional 
security complex, where policies and action in one part of the Horn may have major 
implications for conflicts in other parts of the region. This is typical of African regions where 
informal cross-national processes may have stronger force than the formal processes of the 
state itself (Dokken 2010:352). However, such a broader study would have been difficult to 
conduct within the timeframe available.  
There are many international actors involved in Somalia, either by physical presence or 
through political, financial and diplomatic means. Five actors are studied in depth here: the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the European 
Union (EU), the United States and the United Nations (UN). Of these, the AU and the EU are 
present with troops on Somali soil and in Somali waters; the UN and the United States have 
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been military present through peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in the 1990s, 
and IGAD was originally intended to be present through the mission IGASOM which 
stranded and consequently led the AU to deploy the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) in 2007. Thus all five actors have been involved in the planning and/or execution 
of security-political operations in Somalia. In addition, all actors are at the present time 
actively directing security-political measures of military, technical or diplomatic character 
towards Somalia. ‘Measures of technical nature’ include, for example, the contribution of 
materiel to AMISOM operations. Of course, there are other possible candidates for this study, 
such as NATO, Turkey and the Arab League. Some of these actors will be commented on in 
the thesis, but the main analytical focus remains on the five above-mentioned actors. This is 
largely due to time constraints. In the case of Turkey this is also because my efforts at 
establishing contact with Turkish representations in Nairobi and Addis Ababa during 
fieldwork did not succeed. 
Further delimitations of the study are related to a key challenge for the research: gaining 
access to information. It is obviously impossible to access all or most intelligence material 
that could be of interest when analysing an actor’s approach towards Somalia. What is 
possible, however, is to study other actions, such as engagement in operations or the provision 
of financial or logistical support. Through interviews it is also possible to obtain information 
regarding priorities and which policy areas actors are interested in pursuing. Published 
strategy documents and reviews can also help in understanding the actor’s security 
perspective. However, strategic documents might not capture which policies are actually 
given priority on the ground. To develop a more comprehensive picture of the actors’ 
perspectives, interviews serve as an essential source of information.  
To gather information, I conducted fieldwork in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and in Nairobi, 
Kenya. The fieldwork was conducted over three weeks, two of which I spent in Nairobi. Two 
types of informants have been interviewed: primary informants are spokespersons who 
represent one of the actors analysed; secondary informants are other diplomats, professors and 
experts, such as non-governmental workers, who have obtained in-depth knowledge useful for 
shedding light on the research question. In total 18 informants were interviewed, 17 during 
fieldwork and one in Norway. Of these, 11 informants represented one of the five actors 
studied, and seven informants were from the academic world, NGOs and other diplomatic 
institutions. All interviews were conducted in a semi-structured form. Literature has also been 
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consulted: primary literature in the form of official documents from governments and 
organizations, and secondary literature in the form of previous research and news articles.  
The focus on actors’ policies towards Somalia only implies that the study has a narrow scope, 
where results cannot be automatically generalized to other cases. However, the study does 
involve comparative elements, as it compares how various actors choose to direct their 
security policies and measures towards the same state or region. Thus, although the study 
cannot be used for direct generalization, it may prove relevant for other cases through 
contingent generalization – a limited generalization which for instance can be used to fill out 
the cells of a more comprehensive theory (George and Bennett 2005:112). The study might 
help in identifying specific problems that must be dealt with to be able to conduct coherent 
policies, when political actors placed on different levels in the international system are 
operating in the same country. Such prospects for generalization will above all apply when 
the policies are directed towards states with similar features, often described as ‘weak’ or 
‘failed’ states. In this way the study will provide information of relevance for more than the 
Somali case. However, it must be noted that each and every state is characterized by specific 
internal conditions that make it unique. Any generalizations should therefore be conducted 
with caution.  
1.3 Earlier research – contextualization  
There has been considerable research on several fields linked to the research question of this 
thesis. Much has been written about Somalia, terrorism and piracy. Likewise, much has been 
written about the initiatives of the African Union, the UN and other international actors in the 
Horn of Africa. There have been studies reflecting on the lack of policy coherence or 
differences in approaches amongst international actors (see Sabala 2011, Kagwanja 2006, 
Tadesse 2004). However, fewer studies have compared the involvement of various 
international actors, and none – to my knowledge – have studied the five actors chosen here 
for comparison with an explicit focus on their perspectives on security. Further, I know of no 
studies that enquire whether such perspectives can inform the apparent lack of coherence. 
This is where this thesis seeks to fill a gap in the current research picture. 
The closest we come to research conducted on this topic are perhaps studies carried out by 
Medhane Tadesse (2004), assistant professor of history at the Kotebe College of Teachers’ 
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Education in Addis Ababa, and by Peter Kagwanja (2006), research director of the 
Democracy and Human Rights Program at the Human Sciences Research Council in South 
Africa.  According to both these authors, the US focus on the war on terror after the events of 
9/11 has affected thinking about security in the Horn of Africa. Tadesse (2004) claims the 
new focus on terrorism has led to a refocusing, away from human security aspects, which 
were important in the 1990s, to new security paradigms more focused on state security and 
militarization. In this way, Tadesse points out how international actors may have influenced 
the security perspectives in the region. He asks what is risked if excessive militarization of 
security is undertaken in a region where the state apparatus and the institution of democracy 
are weak. Kagwanja (2006:84) points out that greater coordination between national and 
international initiatives in the Horn of Africa is necessary both to fight and prevent terrorism, 
and to prevent the war on terror from undermining democracy and stability in weak 
democracies. Thereby he touches on a vital question of this thesis: to what extent the efforts 
of various actors pull in the same direction. 
Further academic contributions have been made by Kizito Sabala (2011), political officer at 
IGAD Liaison Office Nairobi and doctoral candidate at the Institute of Diplomacy and 
International Studies at the University of Nairobi. Sabala (2011:114) notes that there are many 
international actors that promote both security and insecurity in Somalia. He holds that, while 
international and regional approaches have been motivated by the war on terror and counter-
piracy, the main efforts to solve the conflict should address the fundamental issues. To Sabala 
(2010:114,111) the core question is this: what is needed to achieve a stabilized Somalia with a 
government that has the capacity and effectiveness to deal with the country’s problems? 
Terrorism and piracy have served to “divert attention and resources from the real issues and 
the search for a political solution to a political problem”; as Sabala remarks, “pirates were not 
born in the ocean” (2011:111). Further, he stresses the importance of designing an effective 
diplomatic strategy in which cooperation is rethought (2011:115). In this way actors with 
negative influences can be excluded and the true interests of Somalia can be given priority. As 
a first step he sees genuine support for the UN-led process as necessary, even though the 
process has had its flaws (2011:113). Sabala’s contribution can thus be seen not only as an 
analysis of the actors involved and an evaluation of their cooperation, but also as an argument 
for studying the actors’ underlying perspectives and objectives, as he points out that external 
actors are in fact not dealing with what needs to be dealt with.  
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This research project is situated between two areas of research. On the one hand, the study 
concerns empirical research on actors’ policies toward Somalia, as does the research of 
Tadesse, Kagwanja and Sabala. On the other hand this thesis relates to research in the field of 
security studies and on the subject of coherence, drawing on wider theoretical or conceptual 
debates. Chapter three presents how such debates can be used to shed light on the research.  
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter two gives background information about the diverse security challenges in Somalia 
and the international engagement in the country. Chapter three presents the theory and 
conceptual debates applied in the analysis. The chapter shows how this thesis is situated 
within the broader field of security studies, and discusses the concept ‘referent object’ and 
which measures actors can use to secure a referent object in a country like Somalia. Finally, 
the chapter discusses how various theoretical perspectives can be used to explain which 
factors influence coherence in policymaking. Chapter four outlines the methodology 
employed in the thesis and provides an operationalization of the concepts security perspective 
and coherent policies.  
The analysis starts in chapter five. Here, I analyse to what extent actors have a shared security 
perspective, which provides an answer to the first part of the research question. This is done 
through analysis of the five areas which were defined through the operationalization of the 
concept security perspective. Briefly put: strategic objectives, objectives for engagement in 
Somalia, security political measures, actors’ views on al-Shabaab and the referent objects of 
actors’ policies are discussed. Chapter six provides an answer to the second part of the 
research question. The chapter begins by presenting two examples of lack of policy 
coherence. Thereafter, it analyses what the challenges to coherence are, in light of the debates 
in chapter three. Coordination between actors, local ownership and national interests are 
analysed as influential factors.  
The final chapter concludes by summarizing the main findings of this study. The two research 
questions are first answered separately. Thereafter the chapter analyses the answers to the two 
questions seen together. The choice of theory is discussed, and suggestions are offered as to 
which broader conclusions may be drawn from the research. Finally, the chapter provides 
some reflections on the future of Somalia, in light of what the analysis has revealed.    
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2 Empirical background  
The main problem afflicting the Republic of Somalia is that it is at war with itself, 
with the region and with the international community (Sabala 2011: 96). 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to aspects of the Somali history and the 
history of international engagement in Somalia that are important to consider when 
researching and answering the research question. A brief overview of recent Somali history, 
from the fall of Syad Barre until the election of a new president in September 2012 will set 
the scene. After this, security political challenges and threats to international, regional and 
national security are presented in section 2.2. The chapter ends with a presentation of the five 
actors whose policies are analysed.  
2.1 Historical overview 
After decades under colonial rule and a period as a UN protectorate, the independent Republic 
of Somalia was formed in 1960. In 1969 Mohamed Syad Barre seized power, and when his 
government collapsed in 1991 the Somali civil war broke out in full scale. In 2000 the 
Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed, followed in 2004 by the establishment 
of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Nairobi, Kenya. The TFG first met in 
Somalia in 2006, because of security concerns (Sabala 2011:109). On 20 August 2012 the 
first federal Parliament since 1991 was instated. A new temporary constitution was adopted, 
and on 10 September the parliament chose Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the new president of 
the Federal Government of Somalia (Flyktningehjelpen 2012:42). Somalia today is a state 
operating with at several separate administrative entities. The South Central Somalia has until 
recently had the TFG as its central government. Another entity is Puntland which declared 
autonomy as a federal state in 1998. Somaliland is a separate entity which has earlier sought 
independence from the Republic of Somalia (McKay 2011: 229), but has not been recognized 
as an independent state. More recently, Galmudug declared autonomy within a federalized 
Somalia in 2006. The region of Jubaland which borders on both Kenya and Ethiopia declared 
its autonomy in 2010.  
The Somali society is organized along vertical patrimonial clan-lines, and Islam is the 
strongest horizontal identity which cuts across these (Sabala 2011:97). Since the outbreak of 
the civil war the Somali conflict has revolved around political leadership and clans fighting 
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for control (ibid). The breakdown of law and order created an environment where groups 
actively sought profit in activities that undermine peace (Sabala 2011:98). Local warlords 
ruled different parts of the country, which made it impossible for the TFG to exercise 
effective control over parts of Mogadishu and in southern and central parts of the country 
(Sabala 2011:109).  
The Islamic Court Union (ICU) controlled Mogadishu and large parts of the southern Somalia 
from the summer of 2006. In December the same year Ethiopian forces marched to 
Mogadishu in support of the TFG. This caused a splinter group from the ICU, al-Shabaab, and 
other rebel movements to attack the Ethiopian forces and the TFG in Mogadishu in March 
2007 (Landinfo 2012:2). The international community called on Ethiopia to withdraw its 
forces, but realized that the presence of troops was essential to prevent the Somali state from 
relapsing into chaos (AMISOM 2008). The same year the African Union’s peacekeeping 
mission AMISOM therefore landed in Mogadishu to support the TFG, after the initial plan of 
an IGAD-led mission had stranded (ibid). Although AMISOM is described as a peacekeeping 
force, my informants agreed that it is a peace enforcement mission. The mission first 
consisted of soldiers mainly from Uganda and Burundi, and has grown to a force of over 
10 000 soldiers (Flyktningehjelpen 2012:42). The Ethiopian forces finally withdrew from 
Somalia in 2009, but intervened again on 20 November 2011 (New York Times 2011b). Only 
a few days earlier, on 16
 
November, the Kenyan government sent 2000 soldiers over the 
border to Somalia, claiming that al-Shabaab threatened the Kenyan tourism industry (Hansen 
2012:6). These soldiers were later incorporated into AMISOM. 
2.2 Threats to national and international security 
In the Failed States Index 2012, Somalia was ranked at the top of the list as the most ‘failing’ 
country in the world (Messner 2012:4). The concept ‘failed state’ has been used by Western 
government actors and policy analysts who have sought to describe the alarming proliferation 
of civil conflict, the fragmentation of state institutions and the deterioration of security 
conditions (Nay 2013:326-327). The instability and violence in Somalia has been perceived as 
a threat on several levels in the international system. First and foremost the instability and 
violence has implied a threat to the human security of Somali citizens. Somalia has a 
population of around 10 million, of which 1.3 million are internally displaced refugees 
(Flyktningehjelpen 2012:38). There are also 1 million refugees from Somalia currently in 
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other countries (ibid), with the biggest part in the world’s largest refugee camp in the north of 
Kenya (Flyktningehjelpen 2012:4). Insecurity manifests itself not only in fear of violence, but 
also in food insecurity and lack of possibilities. Some 70 % of the population of Somalia is 
under 30 years of age (UNDP 2012: xix). The unemployment rate for youth between 14 and 
29 is 67%, which is one of the highest in the world (ibid). Lack of employment topped the 
scale when youths in Somalia were asked to rank their frustrations in the 2012 Human 
Development Report on Somalia (UNDP 2012: xx). This jobless and uneducated youth is the 
most vulnerable group in Somalia. They are also a major risk factor in regard to criminal 
behaviour: for example, youth constitute the bulk of the participants in the terrorist insurgency 
group al-Shabaab (ibid).  
Developments in Somalia have further been perceived as a threat to security in the broader 
region and internationally. In 2008, al-Shabaab was put on the US list of terror organizations 
(Landinfo 2012:2), and the same year the head of the Norwegian Police Security Service 
(PST) stated that the organization was a terrorist organization (NTB 2011). Kiras (2010:187) 
defines terrorism as  
[T]he sustained use of violence against symbolic or civilian targets by small groups 
for political purposes, such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a 
political grievance, and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response.  
In recent years al-Shabaab has carried out several attacks in Kenya, mainly using grenades, 
and the country has also received threats of bigger terrorist attacks on national buildings 
(allAfrica 2012). In this way al-Shabaab has come to constitute a significant threat to regional 
security. Together with AMISOM, Kenyan and Ethiopian forces managed to drive al-Shabaab 
out of Mogadishu and several areas of Somalia in the course of 2012 (Hansen 2012:6). 
Important progress was made when the Kenyans, under AMISOM, captured the city of 
Kismayu from al-Shabaab at the end of September 2012 (Daily Nation 2012b). This led to 
positive reports in the Kenyan press, declaring that the time has come for professionals to 
invest in Somalia (Daily Nation 2012a).  
In early February 2012 al-Shabaab tightened its ties to al Qaida, with the al-Shabaab leader 
Mukhtar Abu al-Zubair pledging loyalty to al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri (CNN 2012). 
However, Guglielmo (2011) claims that it is erroneous to hold up al-Shabaab as evidence of 




[I]f we consider al-Shabaab as a movement totally alien from the Somali social 
context we risk obscuring its real substance. The organization has been able to adapt 
itself to the dynamics of the Somali conflict, either benefiting from them or, in some 
cases, becoming a victim of the country’s instability (2011:137).  
Al-Shabaab was probably formed in 2003, but the movement first increased radically during 
the Ethiopian occupation between 2006 and 2009 when many saw it as the lone defender of 
Somalia after the ICU had splintered and moved its leadership abroad (Guglielmo 2011:127), 
into Yemen and Eritrea (Sabala 2011:101). The cross-clan structure of the movement is also a 
crucial factor for its survival and proliferation, as this has allowed it to operate in several parts 
of the country and recruit and access supplies in different areas (Guglielmo 2011:127).  
While al-Shabaab has concentrated its attacks on the Horn of Africa, it has constituted a threat 
to Europe and the United States because it has attracted citizens of Western countries to leave 
for Somalia and join the organization. According to journalist Mary Harper (2012:99), the 
FBI estimates that between September 2007 and October 2009 more than twenty Somalis 
from the diaspora left the US state of Minnesota to join the Islamist insurgency in Somalia. In 
2010 fourteen American Somalis were charged with acts of terrorism, including the provision 
of materiel and funds to al-Shabaab, in the United States (Harper 2012:100). From Europe it 
has also been underlined that the British citizens who carried out the London bombings in 
2004 were of Somali ethnicity. The image of Somalia as a terrorist threat has further 
components as well. Primarily Somalia posed a terrorist threat because it was  used as a 
transit point for the terrorists who carried out the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania 
and Kenya in 1998, and the bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa in 2002 (USIP 
2004:9). Evidence indicates that both al Qaida members and members of the Yemeni 
Sulieman Abdulla have moved freely between Kenya and Somalia and resided in Mogadishu 
(USIP 2004:9-10).  
In addition to terrorist and insurgency threats, problems of piracy and warlordism have 
contributed to the destabilization of the country. Piracy has been an increasing problem in 
Somali waters for the last 10 years (Bjørgo and Gjelsvik 2012:4). The problem may be 
understood “both as an outgrowth of the war economy as an outcome of a weak or non-
existent state power and an inadequate police and coast guard” (ibid). However, reports from 
2012 show that piracy has now become much less successful and thus less profitable. As of 
the end of September 2012, only five ships had been seized by pirates, whereas 47 ships had 
been captured in 2010 and 25 ships in 2011 (Aftenposten 2012).  
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2.3 International actors involved  
This section concentrates on the five actors studied in this thesis. As the actors will be 
thoroughly analysed later, the section outlines each actor’s relation to Somalia only briefly.  
The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established in 1992, through the 
Security Council’s resolution 751 (Sabala 2011:106). The goal of the operation was to impose 
a ceasefire inside Somalia. UNOSOM II, established in March 1993 also included 
enforcement measures to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance in 
Somalia. The mission was withdrawn in 1995 (ibid: 107). Currently, the UN engagement is 
divided between two political missions, the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and the 
UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), and what is normally referred to as the ‘Country 
Team’ (CT) for Somalia. The Country Team consists of 24 agencies, funds and programmes 
including UNDP Somalia, which is located in Nairobi (UNCT Somalia 2010). 
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was originally a forum for dealing 
with issues related to drought and development, established by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Somalia, Sudan and Uganda in 1986. Today the organization can also be considered a 
security-political actor (Dokken 2008:19). IGAD played an important role in the Eldoret-
Mbagath Peace Process which started in October 2002 (Sabala 2011:100). The most 
important outcome of this process was the development and adoption of the Federal Charter 
which led to the formation of the TFG. Since 2002 IGAD has maintained a strong focus on 
Somalia, especially through the IGAD Office of the Facilitator for Somalia Peace and 
National Reconciliation. The main task of this political office has been to follow up the 
implementation of the Eldoret-Mbagath Process. The office has dedicated itself to mobilize 
resources for the TFG and has sought to play a coordinating role (Informant O 01.02.2013). 
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has had UN approval under Resolution 
1744. The mission was deployed in February 2007, first for a period of six months (Sabala 
2011:99). Up until 2011 AMISOM deployed troops only from Uganda and Burundi and until 
2010 the combined force in Mogadishu consisted of 5250 soldiers, which was 3000 fewer 
than the minimum number required (Sabala 2011:99). Several countries have trained 
AMISOM soldiers, including Kenya, Djibouti, Turkey and Sudan (ibid). In late November 
2011 Kenyan and Ethiopian forces was sent into Somalia, as these neighbouring countries felt 
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the unease of the situation. AMISOM assumed official command over the Kenyan troops on 6
 
July 2012 (AMISOM 2012b).  
The European Union’s engagement in Somalia has political, diplomatic, civilian, military, 
humanitarian and developmental dimensions. Together these constitute the EU 
Comprehensive Approach (European Commission 2012a). The EU is one of the largest 
financial donors to AMISOM through the African Peace Facility. In March 2012 the EU 
allocated €67 million to support AMISOM (European Commission 2012a), bringing the total 
contribution to AMISOM through the Peace Facility up to €325 million. This funding is used 
to cover allowances for soldiers, operational running costs, transportation, medical expenses, 
housing, and fuel and communication equipment (ibid). The EU Training Mission also trains 
Somali Security Forces. In early 2013 the training mission’s mandate was extended until 
March 2015 (East African 2013). The EU is present in Somali waters through the European 
Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR – Atalanta). The operation, 
launched in December 2008, is provided with a UN mandate to protect vessels of the World 
Food Programme (WFP), and shipping related to AMISOM’s activities (EU NAVFOR).  
The United States suffered the loss of 18 of its soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 in 
the incident which has become known as ‘Black Hawk *Down’. This has influenced the US 
approach towards Somalia ever since, and has resulted in statements like that made by the 
Obama administration’s top State Department official for Africa, Johnnie Carson, who said: 
“We do not want an American footprint or boot on the ground” (New York Times 2011a). 
However, the United States is active in the region through the military programme Combined 
Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa, which was established in 2002 and is based in Djibouti. In 
June 2012 the Obama administration acknowledged for the first time that the US military 
have conducted drone strikes in Somalia (Wall Street Journal 2012). Not much is known 
about the extents and depth of the US counterterror involvement in Somalia. However, the 
United States is a large player in Somalia in other areas as well. USAID conducts projects in 
the spheres of governance, food security, education and economic growth (USAID 2013), and 
the United States also supports AMISOM and UNSOA. Since 2007, the United States has 
provided $340 million in assistance to AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and 
provided approximately $150 million for its share of assessed costs for UNSOA (Swan 2012). 
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3 Theory   
This chapter establishes the theory foundations of this thesis, and presents discussions on 
theories and concepts referred to in the analysis. I begin by situating this thesis within the 
field of security studies and security theory. To explain what is meant when this thesis 
assumes that actors – including organizations – can have a security perspective, the chapter 
draws on constructivist and intergovernmentalist theory. This explanation, given in section 
3.1, is important not only while it establishes the theory foundations; it is also of significance 
for the choice of method presented in chapter four, because basic assumptions on how a 
security perspective is formed have implications for how such a perspective can be studied.  
The analytical framework relating to the first part of the research question is presented in 
section 3.2. Section 3.2.1 discusses how the pursuit of different policies can enhance the 
security of different referent objects. The chapter then takes a closer look at two theory 
debates which can be connected to security perspectives in the Somali case. The first concerns 
which policies one should start implementing in a state that lacks basic governance structures, 
often referred to as a ‘failed’ state. This is of significance because an actor who wishes to ‘fix’ 
or ‘build’ a state will secure referent objects in the process. The second debate concerns 
which measures should be used when seeking to counter terrorism, and is of interest because 
the choice of measures is part of an actor’s security perspective, as shown in the 
operationalization in chapter four. Section 3.3, presents theory on coherence which will be 
used when analysing the second part of the research question. This section discusses what can 
influence coherence, in light of the various theory perspectives. Factors highlighted here are 
later analysed in chapter six.  
3.1 Theory foundations of the thesis 
Security studies is a sub-discipline of international relations (IR) which includes studies on 
core assumptions regarding ‘what is to be secured’ and ‘how’ (Collins 2010:2). Building on 
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) and Collins (2010), a security perspective is in this thesis 
defined as an actor’s view on what constitutes a threat to security, what the principal object 
to be secured is, and by which measures it is to be secured. Thus, an actor’s security 
perspective is displayed through the policies it develops. As discussed below, different theory 
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perspectives will give different answers as to how an organization can have a security 
perspective.  
Security theory is a specific subset of security studies, because it, unlike the larger discipline, 
deals explicitly with theory (Wæver and Buzan 2010:465). Security theory can, according to 
Wæver and Buzan, be defined as “theory that aims at the understanding and/or management 
of security issues” (2010:464). This theory can at different points in time resemble 
developments in general IR theory, as is the case for the constructivist approach to security 
and international relations (2010:465). Other security theories such as deterrence theory and 
theories on securitization, as promoted through the Copenhagen School, were originally 
specific to security studies, and not a part of the general field of IR (ibid). Wæver and Buzan 
note differences in security theory developments within the United States and Europe; and 
explain this by the fact that while the United States sees itself as the actor that shapes the 
world – and therefore needs information about cause and effect – Europe takes a different 
position towards security where problematizing and a wider definition of security becomes 
possible (2010:474-475). This thesis seeks to contribute this ongoing theory development.  
The thesis shares with Wæver and Buzan (2010) the desire to problematize the concept of 
security within a wider framework. This is why it explicitly seeks to compare security 
perspectives, and to relate a discussion of security perspectives to a discussion of coherence in 
policies. As proponents of the Copenhagen School, Wæver, Buzan and de Wilde are known 
for their theory of securitization. Securitization refers to the process whereby “an issue is 
framed as a security concern and hence treated as a prioritized matter by top leaders […]” 
(Stokke 2011:329). This process takes place through speech acts (Mutimer 2010:91). These 
considerations clearly widen the possibilities of what can be considered ‘security policies’. As 
securitization theory focuses on the processes of creating a security issue through speech acts, 
securitization is often analysed through discourse analysis, although this is not the only 
method that can be used (Buzan et al. 1998:177). By contrast, this thesis focuses on outcomes. 
Instead of analysing discursive processes establishing how actors have come to obtain their 
perspectives; the focus is on what the perspectives are – and whether actors’ security 
perspectives are a factor which can explain the degree of coherence in policies. Still, it is of 
interest to consider how actors’ perspectives are formed, because understanding the process 
behind a perspective will make it easier to also understand what the perspective is. While the 
thesis assumes that actors have adopted a perspective on security, it does not blindly follow 
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Wæver and Buzan (2010) in assuming that speech acts are the basis for a security perspective. 
I argue it is necessary to draw on theoretical pluralism in order to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of how an actor’s security perspective is formed.  
The actors studied in this thesis are different from each other through the fact that their 
decision-making processes are different and that they to lesser or greater extent are unitary 
actors. This has significance when one is to understand how actors’ perspectives are formed. 
Hill and Smith (2011:8) underline how the comprehension of the EU in international relations 
is not gained by using only one theory; “[…] pluralism is required when seeking to explain 
and understand the EU’s international relations. No one approach, whether broad-brush as in 
realist, rationalist, and constructivist, or more specific, as in geopolitics, 
intergovernmentalism […] comes near being adequate by itself”. Following Hill and Smith, 
this thesis draws on several theories and concepts in seeking to capture what an actor’s 
security perspective is and how it is formed. Hill and Smith (2011) are clear about the 
difficulties that arise when using different, possibly incompatible, theories in analysis, but 
they hold that a combination of theoretical understandings is “inevitable in any attempt to do 
justice to complexity” (ibid). Such a solution is not necessarily in contradiction to the research 
of Wæver and Buzan, as they write that “[t]he different new schools in Europe increasingly 
intersect and form a field with opportunities for a new generation to combine and innovate 
across the theories” (Wæver and Buzan 2010:481). Here it will be argued that both 
constructivist and intergovernmentalist theory can provide useful lenses for viewing and 
understanding how an actor’s security perspective is formed.  
While realist theory sees inter-state collaboration on security issues as a rare an unnatural 
phenomenon (Glaser 2010:17), intergovernmentalist theory provides an explanation as to how 
organizations can develop and implement policies in the realm of security, highlighting the 
organization as a bargaining forum. Robert Putnam (1988) sees cooperation in liberal 
organizations as a two-level game where the outcome of political bargaining at the national 
level is deciding for which options states have available in international bargaining. This 
means that national affairs have priority, and that, although international organizations can 
play a role, the combinations of alternatives available in international negotiations can be 
strictly limited. This is an interesting view to consider, as it will imply that a security 
perspective within an organization may be the output of a bargaining process in which strong 
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states can play a strong role, but where other states also possess joint power over the decision-
making process.  
Constructivist and critical approaches emphasize the importance of cognitive factors in the 
elaboration of foreign policy, a field largely ignored by the positivist methodology of realists 
and liberalists (Andreatta 2011:35). Constructivists emphasize that norms and institutions are 
of significance in international relations (ibid: 36). Using a constructivist perspective, an 
organization in itself is not merely able to develop a security perspective – it is also likely to 
do so. Some constructivist approaches see organizations as catalysts for a process whereby 
states become socialized and institutional aims and perspectives are developed (Smith 
2004b:100). Other constructivist claim that although states do not transfer sovereignty to the 
organizations and in theory still possess ultimate control, in practice states will follow ‘rules 
of appropriateness’ developed within the organization (March and Olsen 1998). Using a 
constructivist perspective, it is thus likely that the organization not only has a security 
perspective, but that this perspective is the outcome of the process of organization in itself – 
not a reflection of the views of strong state actors. Constructivist thought opens up the 
possibility of seeing the formation of a security perspective within an organization as a 
dynamic process where several types of actors at various levels are involved. A constructivist 
perspective allows us to overcome the rigid agent–structure divide and to conceptualize 
agents and structures as ‘mutually constitutive’ (Wendt 1987:360).  
It can thus be argued that a security perspective can be formed both as a consequence of 
intergovernmental bargaining and through a process of constructions. If we open up for the 
use of several theories to analyse actors’ perspectives, amongst them constructivist thought, 
we must clarify the issue of epistemology. While constructivism sees social life as a construct, 
it has been argued that the objective study of social life is impossible given a constructivist 
perspective. Although the Copenhagen School is regarded as constructivist, its proponents 
have argued for the possibility of conducting research through a largely positivist 
epistemology. They recognize the social construction of social life, but argue that the 
construction in the security realm in “sufficiently stable over the long run that it can be treated 
as objective” (Mutimer 2010:91). This thesis will here follow the adherents of the 
Copenhagen School in claiming that, although security perspectives might be subject to 
change, they are sufficiently stable over time to be studied through positivist methodology. 
However, as I assume that both intergovernmentalism and constructivism can have 
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explanatory power in forming actors’ security perspectives, the use of discourse analysis – as 
promoted in securitization theory – seems insufficient as a method. As described in chapter 
four, the use of elite interviews supported by literature reviews is believed better enable a 
thorough analysis. 
3.2 Analytical framework: Security perspective  
Having argued that an actor’s security perspective can be influenced both by bargaining 
processes and through the development of norms and values inside an organization or a state, 
let us turn to some theory debates which will be used explicitly in the analysis of the first part 
of the research question.  
3.2.1 Referent object 
When analysing an actor’s security perspective, the referent object of actor’s policies is 
essential. A referent object is the thing to be made secure through security policies (Collins 
2010: 2). According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:36), a referent object is that which 
one can point to and say “It has to survive; therefore it is necessary to…” An important 
distinction in the security literature is drawn between state-centric approaches to security, and 
human security approaches, which view the state and the human being, respectively, as the 
object that needs to be secured. In modern history, since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, one 
has traditionally sought to secure the state; and the traditional measures to this end have been 
the use or threat of military force through war, deterrence, alliances and more recently arms 
control (Collins 2010:7). In the 1990s, the human security agenda contributed to a shift of 
attention, towards human suffering as a central concern in international relations. Human 
security has been defined as “the protection of individuals and communities from war and 
other forms of violence” (Kerr 2010:124). The human security approach can be linked both to 
early liberal writing on equality and freedom, and also to critical security theory which sees 
state-centric and military security as a flawed approach (ibid: 122). The launching of the 
report The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty in 2001, and the subsequent significance of the R2P norm in 
international politics, as in the war in Libya, can be seen as a direct consequence of a 
heightened awareness of the importance of human security. This awareness has to a large 
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extent been brought on by experiences of genocide and ethnic cleansing in countries such as 
Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo (Mutimer 2010:88). 
After 1990, security studies have been widened to comprise not only human security, but also 
concepts such as economic security, environmental security, regime security and food 
security (Collins 2010). These can be seen as overlapping concepts, but they also have a 
distinct focus of their own. However, what is considered referent objects does not appear to 
change. In most approaches to security, human beings and the state remain the two principal 
objects to be secured. Environmental security and regime security may be the two toughest 
competitors in this sense, as they open up for interpretations of the environment as a value in 
itself that needs protection (Barnett 2010:224), and the regime as the object to be secured 
rather than the state as such or the people in it (Jackson 2010:187). Regime security is 
typically adopted as a strategy within weak states, where the ruling elite are particularly 
vulnerable to security threats from within (Jackson 2010:185). Jackson writes that in practice 
state security and regime security become indistinguishable in a weak state, and draws on 
Somali experiences in particular:  
Because of the fusion of state and government, when a particular regime is 
overthrown, as the Syad Barre regime was overthrown in Somalia, the entire 
apparatus of the state collapses too. In this sense, weak-state security ‘is’ regime 
security. (2010:191)  
The analysis will show that the distinction between state security and regime security in 
Somalia is diffuse today as well.  
What is seen as a referent object will in turn have consequences for what are viewed as 
security political measures. For instance, it is difficult to draw a line between security policies 
and development policies because some development policies can enhance human security. 
Within the human security perspective we find one broad and one narrow school (Kerr 2010). 
According to the broad school of human security, insecurity includes freedom from want 
(ibid: 124). This implies that also food security, economic security and various development 
aspects can be included in the category of ‘human security’. By contrast, the narrow school 
focuses on freedom from fear. This means that human security becomes more linked to 
physical violence or terror. Kerr (2010:127) does not see these two forms of human security 
as contradictions, as she claims some other researchers do. Her argument is that issues which 
concern scholars of the broad school, such as poor governance and poor state capacity, can be 
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considered independent variables that ultimately cause insecurity in the narrow sense, as in 
the form of violence between social groups. Likewise, human security concerns in the narrow 
sense can cause poverty and unemployment. In this way Kerr links the concerns of the broad 
and the narrow school together in a circular causal relationship:  
 
When analysing actors’ security perspectives, it is therefore important to open up for the 
possibility that an actor pursuits human security in a broader form. 
3.2.2 Securing objects in a ‘failed’ state 
By definition a ‘failed’ state will neither be successful in securing its population nor in 
securing the state as such (see Nay 2013:326-327). While it has been debated whether the 
term ‘failed state’ is a correct description of the Somalia (Harper 2012:105), it is clear that 
Somalia has long been without a central system capable of providing its citizens and the state 
itself with security. There is a massive literature on how to deal with state failure. When 
analysing an actor’s security perspective, it is relevant to examine debates highlighting how 
actors should precede when intervening or engaging in a state with a dysfunctional political 
system. The debate revolving around whether the process should be elite-driven and whether 
strong institutions should be introduced first is of particular interest, because different 
approaches indicate the use of political measures which to varying degrees will increase 
human security, state security or regime security. As shown in the analysis in chapter five, 
actors’ choice of measures will be central to the analysis of the actors’ security perspectives.  
Several traditions within academic research see state building or democracy building as an 
elite-run process. One of these is the institutions first approach (Törnquist 2011: 825). In this 
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approach, institution-building and the introduction of law and order are seen as vital for 
securing state stability. Proponents argue that institution-building is so essential for stability 
that this must be introduced before liberal reforms and free elections, since liberal reforms 
and elections can otherwise be open to abuse of power, and ‘premature democratization’ can 
breed violence and political instability (ibid). Thus, this is an argument which centres on first 
securing the state institutions or the state as such, although the rationale behind this also is 
linked to a wish of securing the population.  
The institutions first approach can be connected to Fukuyama’s (2005) work on state-building 
which highlights the need to know more about how we can transfer strong institutions to 
developing countries and weak states. “Particularly in the developing world, weak, 
incompetent, or non-existent government is the source of severe problems” (Fukuyama 2005: 
xviii). In building post-conflict states like Somalia, he therefore advises three stages 
(2005:135-136). After an initial phase of foreign provision of stability through security forces 
and police and technical assistance, actors must concentrate on creating self-sustaining 
institutions in phase two, and strengthening state authority in phase three. The institutions-
first approach is also connected to the sequencing argument, which has roots in the work of 
Samuel Huntington in the 1960s (Törnquist 2011:825) and later has been promoted by 
Mansfield and Snyder (2007). This argument holds that it is dangerous to press states to 
democratize before the necessary preconditions are in place (Mansfield and Snyder 2007:5), 
and that democratization can be achieved through modernization pressures within the existing 
state apparatus (ibid: 6).  
The ‘institution first approach’ was originally part of a reaction towards extensive use of 
market liberalisation as means of peacebuilding and democratization, methods that for 
instance were criticized by Paris (2004). However, the emphasis put on ‘institutions first’, has 
in its turn been criticized. In his study of the peace processes in Aceh, Indonesia, Törnquist 
(2011:825) brings to bear a different perspective on how democratic developments can be 
introduced in a state recovering from violence. While the institutions first argument is more 
focused on elite action, what Törnquist calls the transformation argument has greater focus on 
processes. This argument holds that stable democratic relations can be established in a 
recovering state through processes whereby actors and institutions influence each other in 
seeking to reform the relations of power (Törnquist 2011:825). The argument is connected to 
Carothers’ call for ‘gradualism’, a strategy to create space and mechanisms for political 
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competition even under difficult political conditions. Carothers (2007:17) challenges the 
‘institutions first’ argument in particular, as he claims it could be used by political leaders to 
legitimate lack of democratic reform while one is ‘waiting for’ sufficiently good institutions.  
Although some of this writing is concerned with states with strong central governments or 
dictatorships, the literature can provide a background for analysing developments within 
Somalia, where there is currently a policy vacuum in which actors can choose to pursue either 
the path of ‘institutions first’, building the central institutions – or a path of transformation 
whereby processes are put into place to facilitate bottom–up capacity-building and popular 
participation in a Somali reconciliation process. While a strategy of ‘transformation’ implies 
taking the population’s needs into account furthering some degree of human security through 
democratic decision-making power at the local level, the ‘institution first’ argument can 
become a means for setting state security or regime security first, as it focuses on the elites 
and central institution building.  
3.2.3  Approaches to countering terrorism 
When analysing actors’ security perspectives in this thesis, their perceptions of al-Shabaab 
will be treated as a case-specific and integral part of their security perspective, while the 
threat of this group is seen as a substantial factor for actor involvement. Differences in 
perceptions of terrorist organizations have resulted in two main strategies for countering 
terrorism: one of combat, and one of negotiation. In both cases, critics will claim that the 
option – be it negotiations or military defeat – is unattainable, because they see the terrorist 
organizations differently.  
In his article ‘Addressing terrorism: A theory of change approach’ John Paul Lederach 
(2012:7) distinguishes between a strategy of isolation and a strategy of engagement, writing 
that isolation “essentially proposes a strategy of identifying, targeting and limiting individuals 
and groups who espouse violence defined as terrorism”. Isolation can entail cutting of 
financial networks or targeting the group militarily, as done by AMISOM in Somalia. 
However, some claim that traditional military strategy cannot be used against terrorists. 
Terrorists often prove willing to sacrifice their own lives – which makes it hard to deter them. 
Moreover, they are geographically mobile, and organized in networks where actors in the 
field do not have direct contact with leaders – and that makes it difficult to know exactly 
where to direct policy measures (Lutz and Lutz 2010:341). Similarly, a terrorist group is 
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difficult to defeat by military means as it is part of the country’s population and can be 
reabsorbed into the general population when it pleases. The presence of terrorist threats can 
thus be seen as a challenge to strategy as such, and to strategic theory as an academic field.  
Lederach (2012) highlights that a strategy of isolation limits the possibilities for contact, 
consultation and dialogue, with blacklisted groups. This is opposite of the other strategy, 
engagement, which refers to strategies that require contact, consultation and dialogue. 
According to Lederach; “strategic peacebuilding suggests that engagement must happen with 
a wider set of people and stakeholders at multiple levels of society than is typically 
undertaken in official processes” (2012:7). In this way engagement forms a non-violent 
change strategy based on understanding and deliberative dialogue which is contrary to that of 
isolation (ibid: 8). Moreover, increased engagement will increase the awareness of key 
grievances and concerns which in turn will increase the capacity to deal with these grievances 
and diminish the justification for violence (ibid:12). In addition, Lederach notes, the strategy 
can lead to the consideration of alternative views of contested issues and history, and it can 
increase wider participation and influence the rise of alternative leaders (ibid).  
Here we may note that the engagement strategy is based on the assumption that terrorists can 
be understood and that terrorists are open to change. This is in contradiction to arguments 
presented in connection with strategies of isolation, which stress that terrorists are unlikely to 
be deterred because they are unchangeable in their ways and in their radical behaviour. The 
belief that terrorists are not open to negotiations also furthers the legitimacy of the use of 
military measures for countering terrorism. Thus, assumptions of what a terrorist group really 
is can influence the choice of strategy. As we will see in chapter five, this will be an important 
consideration in the analysis of actors’ perceptions of al-Shabaab. 
3.3 Analytical framework: Coherence 
This section of the chapter establishes the analytical framework for the analysis of the second 
part of the research question. First, it is necessary to establish what we mean by ‘coherence’. 
Next, factors which can increase or hinder policy coherence are discussed in light of various 
theory perspectives in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. When analysing the challenges of reaching a 




Policy coherence in its strictest sense can be deemed to be an unattainable goal; still, it can be 
considered a guiding principle (Gebhard 2011:124). In asking [w]hat are the main challenges 
in achieving a coherent international policy towards Somalia? this thesis therefore seeks to 
understand which factors influence coherence. ‘Coherence’ as a term is used in a multitude of 
ways in the scholarly literature. In this thesis, it will be used in describing external relations 
between one actor in the international system and other actors. Coherence is here defined as; a 
situation where actors in the international system operate and develop policies so that efforts 
pull in the same direction. This builds on the OECD Policy Brief (July 2003:2) where policy 
coherence is defined as: “the systematic promotion of mutual reinforcing policy actions across 
government departments and agencies creating synergies towards achieving the agreed 
objectives”.  
According to Gebhard (2011:106) coherence has two dimensions. The technical dimension 
implies that problems of coherence can be of procedural art, occurring because of difficulties 
in reconciling different channels of policymaking. For instance, coherence can be lacking if 
there is disagreement between actors on how to deal with financial problems. The other 
dimension is the policy dimension. Here, lack of coherence relates to clashing political 
agendas or conflicting strategic objectives. Fundamental differences in security perspectives 
can thus be seen as a factor which can cause lack of coherence in the second form, because a 
difference in security perspective will imply a difference in objectives (see section 4.2). This 
thesis opens up for the possibility of seeing coherence in terms of a third dimension. In line 
with de Coning’s (2012, 2013) use of complexity theory – described below – coherence can 
also be seen as a concept which must possess a local dimension. This understanding is based 
on the perception that for coherence to exist it must be context-specific (de Coning 2012:290).  
In studying coherence in security policies in Somalia, insight from other disciplines should be 
taken into consideration. Peacebuilding is defined by de Coning (2012:1) as the range of 
political, security and developmental actions undertaken by the international community and 
local actors to help consolidate peace. Literature on peacebuilding is therefore highly relevant 
for this case. According to de Coning (2012:1) there exists a ‘coherence dilemma’ in 
peacebuilding. Building on Dan Smith (2004a), de Coning notes a persistent gap between the 
assumption in the peacebuilding community that improved coherence leads to greater 
efficiency and effect, and the fact that significant attempts to improve coherence have not 
been particularly successful.  
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3.3.1 The significance of coordination and self-interest  
From an intergovernmentalist or realist viewpoint, lack of coherence between actors engaged 
in security policies is only natural, as all states are expected to pursue their own national 
interests. In structural realism, this is based on the perception of states as security-seeking 
entities within an anarchical system, where relative gains are more important than absolute 
gains (Glaser 2010:21). Increasing absolute gains is therefore not a sufficient cause for 
cooperating, as this poses the dilemma of “which state will gain more” (ibid). Based on 
intergovernmental theory of two-level games, it could be argued that lack of coherence 
between actors is in fact a probable outcome. If there is no binding forum where states and 
organizations bargain at a higher, ‘third’ level, organizations are likely to enter the 
policymaking field with differing ideas as to what should be done and how it should be done, 
thus conducting incoherent policies. While the UN could be considered such a ‘third level’ 
bargaining forum for states, it does not facilitate for bargaining between organizations. 
However, coherent policies would be a probable outcome if the actors essentially want the 
same thing and stand to gain from the same policies.  
Still, even though actors gain from the same policies, this does not automatically lead to 
coherent policies. The concept of burden-sharing has been used by Hallams and Scheer 
(2012:313) to describe the need expressed by the United States for Europe to take on more of 
the financial burden of NATO operations. Burden-sharing can relate to budgetary means, but 
also to matters of supply of personnel, as the potential loss of lives represents a substantial 
burden. The disagreement between actors on who is to take the burden could represent a 
threat to coherent policies in a case where actors choose to pursue policies which imply less 
costs, without agreeing with other actors on who is to take on the most substantial ‘burden’. 
This challenge to coherence is commented on in chapter six.  
A liberal view of international relations, which accord less significance to the importance of 
two-level games, implies more positive prospects for coherent policymaking. Based on liberal 
thoughts on the importance of integration between states, one could assume that more 
cooperation between states or organizations will lead to more coherence in policymaking. 
This is because frequent interaction, according to liberal views, can enhance the commonality 
of interests and also reinforce the prospects of cooperation (Andreatta 2011:35). Based on a 
similar logic, also constructivist theory can be used to argue that closer cooperation and 
coordination between actors will lead to a more coherent policy. For instance, Wendt 
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(1999:257,299) argues that social interaction among states can lead to more friendly ‘cultures 
of anarchy’ where ideas are shared and states help each other. A prerequisite for such positive 
prospects of coherence must therefore be that actors engage frequently with each other. The 
proposition that closer cooperation and efforts of coordination will lead to more coherence is 
here called the coordination assumption. In answering what the main challenges for achieving 
an international coherent policy is, actors’ efforts at coordination are discussed in chapter six.   
Also analysed in chapter six is whether the prospects for coherence can change with shifts in 
an actor’s priorities. Scholars often use the concepts of ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’ in 
describing actor priorities; and matters of national security have traditionally been seen as 
‘high politics’. However, in 1977 Keohane and Nye argued that ‘low politics’ of economics 
and welfare were becoming ‘high politics’, because international relations are steered by a 
complex interdependence between nations and people, which has made military instruments 
of less use (1977:24-26). While it is normally assumed that an actor’s fundamental 
preferences do not change, the society in which actors operate does change. When studying 
actors’ engagement in a foreign county, we should realize that changes within that country, 
changes at home and changes in other parts of the world can influence an actor’s engagement. 
This is because such changes can mean that the specific problem the actor is engaged in 
moves a step up or a step down on the ‘high low’ policy scale, in absolute or relative terms. In 
considering whether actors are able to establish coherent policies, it should therefore be taken 
into account that actors’ priorities can change, creating an unstable environment for the 
development of coherent policies. Changing priorities can be analysed as a threat to coherence 
within both a constructivist and an intergovernmentalist framework; it is not that the actors’ 
fundamental preferences as such change, but that their priorities change in parallel to external 
developments. 
3.3.2 The significance of local ownership 
Complexity theory provides an alternative answer to how coherence can be established and 
why incoherence exists. De Coning employs complexity theory to inform the peacebuilding 
‘coherence dilemma’. His essential argument is that local ownership is vital for the 
establishment of coherent policies (de Coning 2013:3). Complexity theory addresses multi-
agent systems that adapt and change according to changes in the environment. However, they 
do this without any kind of central control mechanism or strategic plan (ibid). This 
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understanding of the complexity of social systems leads de Coning to define coherence in 
another manner: 
[C]oherence should be understood to pursue an optimal level of cooperation among 
agents in a given context. In a complex-systems context, the concept thus recognises 
that what is optimal will be determined by the specific context within which the system 
is operating (2012:290). 
In this way the local context is essential for the establishment of coherence. As described 
above, this can be understood as a third dimension of coherence as a concept.  
De Coning writes of the need for local ownership in peacebuilding in particular: 
“Peacebuilders need to concede that they cannot, from the outside, definitively analyse 
complex conflicts and design ‘solutions’ on behalf of a local society” (2012:iii). However, the 
claim that local ownership is essential for introducing sane policies in a fragile state has been 
put forward in several fields. In suggesting how states and democracies can be ‘built’, 
Western actors and scholars have been criticized for trying to introduce Western models in 
non-Western societies. As any society is made up of complex systems which have developed 
over time, an outside actor cannot simply introduce an institution from another society and 
expect good results.  
 [T]he ability of external agents to gain knowledge of the complex social systems we 
are dealing with in the peacebuilding context is inherently limited. […] [W]e are not 
able to know enough about these systems to predict their behaviour using a linear 
cause-and-effect science model. Nor can we transfer one model that seemed to work 
well in one context to another and expect that it would work equally well there (de 
Coning 2013:4).   
What a model consists of varies within the literature, but in general the term refers to 
guidance or impositions (here: from the West) regarding the forming of basic features in the 
society. Criticism has been directed at the use of structural adjustment programmes in which 
liberal reforms have been imposed on African countries in ‘exchange’ for the right to receive 
aid (Nustad 2006:237). Evidence of the inapplicability of Western models can also be found 
in Europe. Mair (1997:176-179) notes how the introduction of democratic party systems in 
Eastern Europe has not always succeeded, because these party systems are based on 
developments that were specific in time and place for Western Europe. Coherence, as it is 
viewed in complexity theory, is unlikely to be achieved in war-ridden countries where such 
models are imposed because this gives little room for local ownership.  
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Criticisms of the enforcement of ‘models’ are often linked to criticisms highlighting the use of 
‘buzzwords’ or ‘framing’ within the development realm. Transparency, good governance, 
capacity building and institution building are examples of what has been termed ‘buzzwords’ 
in the development literature. These are all words that sound ‘good’, and which have been 
considered important ‘values’ by international actors. However, according to Cornwall 
(2007:474), these words are “vulnerable to appropriation for political agendas that are far 
from those that the social movements that popularized their use had in mind”. In this way a 
term like ‘local ownership’ can harbour multiple agendas. ‘Framing’ focuses on the use of 
such words or concepts in the interest of strong actors. Through ‘framing’ powerful players 
can draw attention to a specific issue and determine how this issue will be viewed (Bøås and 
McNeill 2004:1). The promotion of ‘good governance’ is according to Taylor (2004:124) a 
powerful example of how an idea can be constructed by the North and imposed as ‘common 
sense’ in the South. In the light of complexity theory, such a process will impede the 
development of coherence, as coherence hinges on local ownership. 
Taking complexity theory into account will imply – not only that lack of coherence can be 
caused by lack of local ownership – but also that coherence cannot be achieved unless local 
ownership exists. The use of such a theory perspective implies that studying policy coherence 
only amongst international actors in insufficient, and that a true study of coherence must 
involve a wider analysis capturing the context, i.e. the country in which the policy is 
conducted. Looking at coherence through the lens of complexity theory will further have 
significance for whether coordination as such should be seen as a factor that promotes 
coherence. Based on the view that local ownership is essential to coherence, it seems evident 
that coordination between actors will lead to greater coherence only where such coordination 
is firmly rooted in local circumstances. Coordination which takes place merely between 
international actors can, according to this perspective, not be seen as a factor that will in itself 
ensure coherence. This aspect is discussed in section 6.3.   
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4 Methodology  
This chapter seeks to create transparency regarding the research process. In short, the research 
strategy chosen for answering the research question is a single case-study, conducted through 
qualitative research in the form of semi-structured interviews during fieldwork. This chapter 
presents the operationalization of the concepts ‘security perspective’ and ‘coherence’. The 
research design will be discussed in relation to established methodological frameworks, as 
those of Adcock and Collier (2006) on measurement validity, and Cook and Campbell’s 
(1979) concepts of validity. Last, the chapter discusses interviews during fieldwork as a 
research method, and presents choices made in relation to the fieldwork. 
4.1 Generalization and internal validity  
Many researchers, among them Lijphart (1971:691), claim that case studies lack substantial 
qualities when it comes to generalizing from one research project into ‘general truths’. The 
potential for generalization is the main component in what Cook and Campbell (1979) call 
‘external validity’. For Lijphart (1975:159-160) generalization is regarded as both a goal in 
itself, and a requirement for a study to prove that its conclusions are valid and reliable. 
Lijphart (ibid) links the low potential for generalization to the fact that the case study involves 
few units of analysis and many variables. This argument has been countered by George and 
Bennett (2005:110-121) who hold that the case study can be used as a basis for generalization 
under certain circumstances. They argue the case that is studied needs to be selected with 
care, and that a well-chosen case can contribute to partial generalizations and theory 
generation, the latter through ‘theory generating’ cases (ibid).   
According to Gerring (2007:38), case studies are most useful for generating hypothesis, not 
for testing them. Building on George and Bennett (2005) and Gerring (2007), this case study 
takes the form of an inductive theory-generating study. That the study is inductive implies 
that theory is generated through research, instead of research being used to test theories 
(Bryman 2004:266). The study aims at developing theoretical understanding of perspectives 
and strategies held by different actors in an area where societal structures have broken down 
and various threats impose risks not only nationally, but also regionally and internationally. 
The study does not aim to develop a new, grounded theory that immediately can be 
transposed in other settings: this is impossible within the given timeframe. Instead, the study 
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should be regarded as a building block in the development of theory on actors’ perspectives 
towards a weak state which poses security risks on multiple levels, building on already 
existing theory. In this way, this case study can also be considered a stepping stone on the 
path towards more generalizable theory. 
In spite of his critique of the case study’s generalizing potential, Lijphart (1971:691) 
acknowledges that the case study has one great advantage – prospects for providing internal 
validity. Internal validity concerns the interpretation of causal mechanisms in the analysis 
(Lund 2002:106). When a link is established between two variables, the problem is to 
establish the causal relationship between them (Cook and Campbell 1979:50). Threats to 
establishing the casual relationship are uncertainty regarding the direction in which the 
causality is moving, and whether there are other underlying or intermediate variables that 
interfere (Lund 2002:116). It can be argued that not only does a case study provide good 
prospects establishing the causal mechanisms: it offers better prospects than if the study were 
based on quantitative research. This is because case studies, when well-constructed, “may 
allow one to peer into the box of causality to locate the intermediate factors lying between 
some structural cause and its purported effect” (Gerring 2007:45). Thus the use of a case 
study does not only facilitate in depth research of the five actors’ perspectives, it also provides 
better possibilities of achieving good internal validity in the study of the second part of the 
research question where it is asked which challenges (X) that affect policy coherence (Y).  
4.2 Operationalization 
A ‘concept’ is a building block in theories, a word or symbol that represents an idea 
(Manheim et al. 2006:19). When this thesis studies to what extent actors have a shared 
security perspective, ‘security perspective’ takes the form of a background concept, “the 
broad constellation of meanings and understandings associated with a given concept” 
(Adcock and Collier 2001:531). Moving from this to a systematized concept is a process 
conducted through reasoning and in the light of the goals of the research (ibid). The concept is 
systematized through a definition. ‘Security perspective’ has been defined as an actor’s view 
on what constitutes a threat to security, what the principal object to be secured is, and by 
which measures it is to be secured. The systematized concept is the basis for 
operationalization in a research process.  
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To be able to investigate whether the five actors have a similar security perspective, we must 
operationalize the theoretical definition of ‘security perspective’ given above. This is in line 
with level three in Adcock and Collier’s model for conceptualization and measurement in 
research; the development of indicators by which the concept can be measured. For a concept 
to be useful it needs to have ‘empirical referents’, which makes it directly or indirectly 
observable (Manheim et al. 2006:20). In this study, an actor’s security perspective will be 
measured along the lines of the following questions, which can be considered as indicators: 
1. How is the problem defined: what is the over-all main concern that the actor has 
regarding Somalia? 
2. What are the main goals that the actor seeks to achieve through its presence? 
3. Which measures does the actor want to apply? 
4. How is al-Shabaab perceived? (case-specific question) 
5. Who or what is being secured through the actor’s policies?  
Question four differs from the others as it is specific for the Somali case. As terrorism is a 
core concern for many of the actors engaged in Somalia, it seems necessary to incorporate a 
question dealing specifically with al-Shabaab. The question is highly relevant, as the fight 
against al-Shabaab has entered a new phase, and crucial to future security in Somalia is the 
question of which measures are taken to prevent the development of a type of insurgency 
already seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. While measures, and especially measures that are not 
yet in place, are hard to study, the analysis focuses on actors’ perceptions of al-Shabaab. As 
the theory chapter shows, this can be of central importance because differing perceptions of a 
terrorist group can be vital for which policies are adopted. To establish a clear image of 
actors’ perspectives, it is also relevant to ask interviewees to which extent they feel their 
organization or state differs from other actors along the lines of these five questions. 
To develop a thorough understanding of each actor’s security perspective it can be useful to 
ask representatives other questions that will help develop an image of the actor. Useful 
information includes questions on the length of actors’ engagements, and questions on 
perspectives in specific policy areas that are viewed as central to security. The length of 
engagement can be seen as central to the actor’s security perspective, as it can say something 
about why the actor is involved, by noting when the actor first got involved, and when the 
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actor intends to withdraw its engagement. The appendix includes a list of questions that were 
asked to develop a better understanding of the actors’ perspectives.  
In answering part two of the research question it has been necessary to specify what is meant 
by coherence. Coherence was defined in the introductory chapter as a situation where actors 
operate and develop policies so that their efforts pull in the same direction. According to 
Gebhard (2011:106) coherence has two dimensions; a technical dimension and a policy 
dimension, and, in line with de Coning (2012:290), a local dimension was added in chapter 
three. Following Gebhard (2011:124), the thesis sees coherence as a guiding principle which 
in its ideal form always can be considered to be challenged. 
To develop good indicators for the second part of the research question, is somewhat less 
straightforward, as we need to develop a broad understanding of actors’ policies in order to be 
able to detect possible constraints to coherence. Thus, the interview might take a less 
structured form when searching for an answer to this question. Some questions that are 
relevant as indicators for answering this part of the research question will focus on 
coordination and actors’ experiences. A valid answer will depend on the respondent’s 
knowledge and willingness to contribute information. In addition to asking representatives 
these questions, it is therefore desirable to ask independent experts about their opinions and 
experiences. Questions regarded as valuable indicators are: 
1. Are there political or structural contradictions which impede coherent policymaking?  
2. Are there financial or logistical contradictions which impede coherent policymaking? 
3. To what extent are you as an organization/state coordinated with others? 
4. Are there institutionalized meetings between your organization/state and others? 
5. Have some actors pursued policies that were unwise in the opinion of people in your 
organization? 
In addition, it can be useful to ask questions relating to issues known to have been subjected 
to discussion. Examples of such questions are presented in the appendix. 
4.3 Measurement validity 
A study has good measurement validity if the scoring of units on the indicators is reliable, and 
if the indicators themselves reflect the operationalized concept (Adcock and Collier 
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2001:533). Here, the scoring on the indicators has been conducted according to information 
provided through semi-structured interviews and information derived from official documents 
and earlier research. Thus, the potential threats to good measurement validity can occur either 
in the development of indicators or in the scoring of units on the indicators. The latter is often 
termed a ‘reliability problem’ (ibid: 531). 
Adcock and Collier (2001) propose several ways of testing measurement validity. Content 
validation is the examination of whether the indicators that have been developed can capture 
the systematized concepts adequately. This includes an evaluation of whether key elements 
have been omitted in the indicators, and whether inappropriate questions are included. In this 
thesis, such an evaluation implies considering whether the questions presented in section 4.2 
cover the concept ‘security perspective’ as it is defined above, and whether the questions 
developed for the second part of research question are sufficient.  
The development of indicators is connected to literature in the field of security studies and on 
the subject of coherence. The indicators have been further developed through reasoning and in 
the light of knowledge on the current situation in Somalia. Thus, the indicators should reflect 
the systematized concepts well, but it is difficult to be certain. One advantage of a qualitative 
study is that it opens up for flexibility in the development of concepts during the phase of data 
collection (Bryman 2004:269-270). This means for example that if, during research, it is 
discovered that actors differ or agree along the lines of a dimension that appears central for 
the concept ‘security perspective’ but has not been included, it will be possible to add such an 
indicator to the concept, or exclude one that appears irrelevant. In addition, other sources such 
as strategy papers, news articles and earlier research, will be consulted in an attempt to obtain 
a thorough understanding of each actor. In this way, the data is triangulated in cases where 
other information sources are obtainable (Woodhouse 2007:169). As noted in the next 
paragraph, the use of semi-structured elite interviews will further enable good measurement 
validity, as it is possible to benefit from the knowledge of the informants.  
4.4 Interviews during fieldwork as a method 
Given the operationalization of the concept ‘security perspective’ and the theory discussions 
on how such a perspective should be considered to be formed, it can be argued that the 
research question will best be answered by using interviews as a research method and by 
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supplementing the research with literature reviews. This is because the operationalized 
questions are of a character that can make it difficult to obtain the information by other 
means. This section begins by explaining why Nairobi and Addis Ababa were chosen as 
fieldwork locations. Next, I present the selection of informants and the choice of semi-
structured interviews; and finally elaborate on some challenges which occurred during 
fieldwork. 
4.4.1 Choice of location  
Having decided to study the policies and perspectives of actors engaged in Somalia through 
interviewing, I had to consider how to obtain relevant information for analysis. Many asked if 
I was going to Somalia. There are several reasons for why I did not go there. First of all, there 
were many reservations and doubts, expressed by the university as well as by my family. 
However, I also spoke to several people who underscored that there were currently safe areas 
where I might go in Somalia. The decisive factor was that I simply did not have enough time 
to establish good connections and a network of personal security. Had I been working on a 
project with a larger time frame, I would probably have been able to conduct some research 
within Somalia in a safe manner. In addition, however, travelling to Somalia would entail 
considerably higher expenses.  
I saw it as necessary for the research to go to Nairobi – independently on whether I had 
travelled to Somalia or not. This is because many actors have representations in Nairobi and 
there is a large international community dealing with Somalia who is situated there. When I 
chose to go to Addis Ababa in addition it was because the African Union is based there and 
because actors such as IGAD have representations in Addis Ababa, not least the IGAD 
facilitation office for Somalia. I found it highly useful to meet people working in the two 
cities, and I am sure this has given me a broader understanding of the organizations and the 
actors. One interviewee (Informant Q 09.02.2013) working in Addis Ababa also noted that the 
differences in geographical location between Nairobi and Addis Ababa have led to some 
differences regarding how internationals see Somalia – those based in Nairobi being more 
occupied with the South-Central and areas bordering on Kenya. Having visited and talked to 
representatives in the two cities, I felt better equipped to analyse the broader international 
engagement. Because I had been advised that there would be more relevant actors to interview 
in Nairobi, I chose to spend two weeks there and one week in Addis Ababa. Realizing that my 
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time in Addis Ababa would be short, I worked intensively to get as many interviews there as 
possible. In the end I conducted seven interviews in Addis Ababa and ten in Nairobi. A few 
interviews were cancelled in each location.  
4.4.2 Informants 
Before leaving Norway I set a goal of interviewing at least two key informants representing 
each of the five actors studied during the fieldwork. In addition I wanted to interview more 
independent experts on the field. In the case of one actor – the United States – I managed to 
get only one interview. In the case of the EU and the UN I got three interviews. In total 18 
people were interviewed, 17 of whom were interviewed during fieldwork. Of the 18 who were 
interviewed, 11 represented one of the actors studied and seven represented other bodies. Of 
these seven, three were from the academic world, one was from an NGO and three were 
diplomats working for their country’s embassy. Three of the people interviewed during the 
fieldwork were Somali by nationality or ethnicity. Only two of the interviewees were women. 
During the fieldwork I tried to increase the rate of Somalis interviewed by asking 
interviewees for Somali connections. I was also aware of the low share of female informants 
and tried to do what I could to get interviews with female experts without detaching myself 
from the research goal of interviewing elites and experts in the field.  
As pointed out by Goldstein (2002:669) a primary concern for research that builds on 
interviews is to get the interview. With this in mind, I started building contacts early on. By 
participating at the conference of Somali Studies International Association at Lillehammer 
early in October 2012, I established contact with several scholars, among them Ibrahim Farah 
of the University of Nairobi. By attending the launch of the UNDP report on Somalia’s 
country programme at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign affairs, I also established contact 
with the Country Director of UNDP Somalia, David Clapp. Both these contacts were willing 
to put me in contact with relevant informants. Further, in the field I used ‘snowball sampling’, 
a technique whereby one asks the interviewees if they know of any other people that it would 
be good to interview. This provided access to other valuable sources.  
Although I had established contacts in advance, there is always a risk of interviews being 
cancelled once the fieldwork has started. Non-response among certain informants can lead to 
biased results, causing random and systematic errors in research (Goldstein 2002:669), which 
in turn will affect measurement validity. A prime concern was the necessity of getting 
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interviews with representatives of all the five actors in focus in this study. Unfortunately, I 
could obtain only one interview with a US representative. On the other hand, Goldstein 
(2002:670) has noted that an advantage with elite interviews is that it is often easier to know 
something about attitudes and characteristics of the non-respondents. This does not mean that 
one is free to interpret based on information obtained elsewhere. But such information can in 
this case help to inform the analysis of the United States, together with the primary 
information obtained through interviewing. As the United States is a substantial actor that 
other actors are aware of, I believe I have enough information to include it in the analysis. In 
addition, as Goldstein (ibid) notes, elite interviews have the advantage that in cases where 
information about an actor is absent, the lack of knowledge can be exposed in the thesis. This 
is opposed to the use of questionnaires where the researcher does not know anything about 
who the non-respondents are. Thus, I decided to treat the United States as an actor in this 
analysis, commenting on any specific matter where my information is limited.  
4.4.3 Semi-structured interviews  
The thesis is based on the use of semi-structured interviews. This typically refers to a context 
where the researcher has a list of questions that are posed to all informants, but where the 
questions can be general in form and there are possibilities to follow up on questions if 
interesting information is provided (Bryman 2004:113). The order in which the questions are 
posed can also vary from interview to interviews (ibid). Semi-structured interviews often use 
open-ended questions (Aberbach and Rockman 2002:674). This is also the case in this thesis, 
and for several reasons. First, the use of open ended questions is an advantage when the 
contextual nuance of the response is of importance. In this study where actors’ perspectives 
are analysed it is essential to establish the context within which informants’ statements are 
made. This requires more attention from the interviewer than in typical highly structured 
interviews (ibid). Further, there has been limited research on the security perspectives 
furthered by various actors in Somalia, which makes it more difficult to formulate close-
ended questions. Thirdly, in line with Aberbach and Rockman, one can argue that open ended 
questions will maximize response validity. This is because “open-ended questions provide a 
greater opportunity for respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks” 
(ibid). In seeking to determine the actors’ security perspectives, I saw it as important that 
informants should be given the opportunity to frame statements in their own way. Fourthly, 
elites or highly educated people seldom like being put in the straitjacket that close ended 
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questions can be (Aberbach and Rockman 2002:674). As the informants interviewed for this 
study are experts on their field, they might dislike questions that do not allow them to give 
their own interpretations. Rather, as Leech points out, “semistructured interviews allow 
respondents the chance to be the experts and inform the research” (2002:665).  
Unstructured interviews would have provided even greater possibilities for informants to 
elaborate on their own views. The disadvantage is that unstructured interviews offer fewer 
possibilities for comparison. As comparison of actors is important in this case, unstructured 
interviews are less suitable. In addition it can prove difficult to get information on the 
research subject if the interview is unstructured and leaves space open for discussion of a 
range of themes and subjects. I therefore found semi-structured interviews to be the most 
useful research method.  
4.4.4 Challenges during fieldwork  
Most of the fieldwork was conducted without substantial problems. Much time was spent 
calling, e-mailing and interviewing informants. On a few occasions I experienced that 
informants had to cancel meetings. This concerned representatives from the UNDP, the EU 
and two representatives from the AU. This presented a problem, as my time in the field was 
limited and the cancellations often were announced only a short time before the interview was 
supposed to take place. Therefore I did not have time to contact and meet anyone else as a 
substitute for the interviews that were cancelled. However, having conducted 17 interviews in 
the field in total, I am satisfied with the outcome of the fieldwork.  
Another challenge was deciding on the form of the interview when in the process of 
interviewing. As explained above, I had decided to use semi-structured interviews, and had 
prepared an interview guide of 20 questions that I saw as relevant for answering the research 
question. However, I was soon impressed with the substantial knowledge among my 
informants. Many of them had followed Somalia issues for decades, and they possessed in-
depth knowledge that put much information I myself had obtained in a different light. That 
made it inadvisable not to benefit further from their information. This in turn, led the 
interviews to take a form that expanded more in the direction of the unstructured interview. 
The interviews were still were conducted in a semi-structured manner – as I guided the 
informant and made sure that I thought the subject of the conversation was relevant to the 
research. However, the interviews became less structured than what I had originally 
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anticipated, as many of the questions I posed were follow-up questions to the information 
provided by the interviewee, and not the initial questions I had prepared. In any case, towards 
the end of an interview I glanced quickly through the main questions, to make sure that the 
most important areas had been covered.  
I see it as an advantage that informants were given space to talk about their views and 
concerns. This led many of them to open up sometimes offering critical perspectives 
regarding their own organizations or their state. This presented a new challenge, as it became 
necessary to distinguish between the informants as representatives speaking on behalf of an 
actor and informants as individuals with their own opinions and sometimes disagreeing with 
the actor they represented. As criticism from within can be a very valuable source of 
information, I chose to let informants speak on behalf of themselves. However, I often 
included some questions on what views the actor itself had on a matter when I felt this 
information was necessary. One consequence of letting the informants speak their minds 
about the actors they represented is that it became necessary to anonymize the informants. 
This I have done by not mentioning the title or the name of the informant, only what kind of 
institution the informant represents. I discussed with each informant whether or how he or she 
could be quoted. Although it would have been advantageous for the transparency of the 
research process to name all informants, I concluded that more would be gained than lost by 
anonymizing the informants. This is because, in many cases, only anonymization would make 





5 Analysis of Security Perspectives 
To what extent do international actors involved in Somalia have similar security 
perspectives? 
This chapter includes part one of the analysis, and analyses to what degree regional and 
international actors in Somalia have a similar security perspective. The analysis is based on 
the definition and operationalization of security perspective given in chapter 4. Extensive 
interviewing was undertaken during fieldwork to get a broad and comprehensive 
understanding of actors’ perspectives. The results are organized and presented in line with the 
operationalization of the concept, which provided five questions (section 4.2).  
In the following, actors’ main concerns and their main goals – questions one and two – are 
analysed together, as an actor’s definition of the problem and an actor’s main goal, by 
consequence are closely connected. This analysis is conducted on two levels: first, at an 
overall strategic level, and second, at the level of Somalia. This is done because actors 
simultaneously can pursue overall strategic objectives based on national interest and 
objectives more narrowly focused on Somalia. After these two analyses are presented in 
section 5.1 and 5.2, section 5.3 will discuss which measures actors want to use in pursuing 
their security politics. Section 5.4 presents an analysis of actors’ perceptions of al-Shabaab. 
Section 5.5 draws on the responses provided in the four first sections, and discusses what the 
referent object or objects for the actors’ security policies is: who or what is being secured in 
Somalia? Finally, section 5.6 provides an answer to the first part of the research question.  
5.1 Problem definition and strategic objective  
This section reflects on self-interest as a predominant factor in determining actors’ strategic 
objectives. Thereafter, it discusses more closely to what extent each actor has a strategic 
objective, and what this is. I highlight the role single states can play within an organization 
when determining what key problems are and what strategic objectives should be. This is in 
line with intergovernmentalist thought on how actors’ security perspectives are formed. 
During fieldwork, several informants reflected openly on the significance self-interest had for 
the involvement of their state or organization. Actors’ perceptions of the overall problem and 
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actors’ strategic objectives are clearly guided by self-interest. A US diplomat (Informant N 
31.01.2013) stated frankly:  
The most pressing issue for us is counter-terrorism. […] Honestly, governance and 
other issues are interesting and important aspects, but for us this is just a vehicle to 
make Somalia less threatening to us, and to the region.  
In the same vein an EU diplomat stated:  
Implicitly, what Europe is buying with the money put into African peace and security 
is security in Europe, secure trade and a way to manage migration (Informant Q 
09.02.2013).  
In the diplomatic circles the weight of self-interest seemed so evident that it was even 
frowned on if a country portrayed its involvement as driven by a purely humanitarian agenda. 
One diplomat (Informant M 30.01.2013) commented that Turkey was naïve in portraying 
itself as having no agenda or interests in Somalia, claiming that the Turkey aimed to be a 
progressive power in the region and to secure business growth. “We know what moves the 
world. It is not a scandal. You [Turkey] did well under the humanitarian crisis – and now you 
have business in Somalia. Good for you.” On the other hand, countries such as Norway have 
shown that a humanitarian agenda can go hand in hand with national interest. As Norwegian 
diplomat, Informant P (01.02.2013) explained; Norway’s engagement in Somalia is closely 
linked to the fact that Norway wishes to present itself as a strong actor in matters of peace and 
reconciliation. As highlighted by academics such as Terje Tvedt (2003), Norway can be seen 
as having a national interest in presenting itself as a peace-nation.  
Looking more closely at the objectives stated by US and EU diplomats, it is clear that these 
are related to problem definitions based on past experiences. The July bombings in London in 
2005 were carried out by British youths of Somali origin (Informant Q 09.02.2013). The 
Americans have on several occasions dealt with youth of Somali origin leaving the United 
States for training camps in Somalia (Harper 2012:99), not to mention the fact that Somalia 
played an important role as transit and residence country for the terrorists who bombed the 
US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 (USIP 2004:9). For the EU, matters of 
trade and migration are perhaps as important as security, or at least more pressing on a daily 
basis. “Any European trade which goes through the Red sea and the Suez Canal has got 
higher overheads because of Somali piracy,” explained one EU-diplomat (Informant Q 
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09.02.2013). The weight put on self-interest revitalizes the classical realist assumption that 
national interest trumps in determining an actor’s foreign policy.  
The case of the EU also shows that national interests can coincide and be expressed in the 
form of a larger, regional self-interest, shaped through intergovernmental negotiations. The 
funding provided to AMISOM through the EU’s African Peace Facility, and the spending of 
the money on Somali affairs is subject to unanimity vote in the EU (Informant Q 09.02 2013). 
However, it is still possible that strong states in the EU play decisive roles, as demonstrated 
by Matlary (2009:126) in the case of the EU’s involvement in Congo in 2003 where the 
decisions of France and the UK proved decisive. In commenting on whether particular 
countries are driving the foreign engagement, an EU-diplomat (Informant Q 09.02.2013) 
answered: “Yes, it is bound to be true. Different countries have different historical 
backgrounds with particular areas.” Especially pertinent in this regard are the former colonial 
powers in Somalia: Italy and Great Britain. France is also not to be forgotten, as has 
repeatedly shown dedication to a strong EU foreign policy (Matlary 2009:79). A French 
initiative was a significant contributor for the initiation of operation Atalanta. When chairing 
a UN Security Council meeting in September 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy told the council:  
France stands ready to ensure security for the assistance provided by the World Food 
Program in Somalia for a period of two months using naval military resources. […] I 
call on all those who wish to do so to join this initiative (AFP 2007).  
This indicates, in line with intergovernmentalist theory, that strong actors can use 
multinational organizations as forums for influence.  
Compared to the clearly stated objectives of the United States and the EU, it is more difficult 
to grasp whether the UN has a strategic objective. This is largely the case because the UN 
itself is not a unitary actor in Somalia. As explained in chapter 2, UN engagement in Somalia 
consists of two political missions and a set of specialized agencies together constituting the 
‘Country Team’ for Somalia. The Country Team is under the leadership of the Resident 
Coordinator, who is also the Humanitarian Coordinator and Designated Official for Security 
(UNCT Somalia 2010). The Country Team does not share leadership with the two political 
missions who are under the leadership of the Special Representative to the UN Secretary 
General, a position held by the head of UNPOS (ibid). This structure, and the fact that all UN 
bodies operating inside Somalia have their own tasks and mandates, results in a split approach 
by the UN in Somalia, something which was criticized by several informants. Whether the 
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political missions and the Country Team should be gathered under one SRSG (Special 
Representative to the Secretary General) was being reviewed in the UN strategic review at the 
time of writing. Such a joint structure would coordinate the UN bureaucracy internally. At the 
time of my fieldwork, it was clear the humanitarian bodies within the UN did not favour a 
joint structure, as this would lead them to compromise their operations. One informant 
(B16.01.2013) explained: “It is not necessarily good to be associated with the political side of 
the UN”. The UN can also be considered split between the UN secretariat and agencies on one 
side and the Security Council on the other. Especially prominent in decisions are the UK, the 
United States and France – popularly referred to as the P3. One informant (K 29.01.2013) 
states: “There is a clear distinction between the P3 and the Secretariat. It is ultimately not the 
UN Secretariat but the member states that decide, through the Security Council.” When put 
together, these circumstances make it difficult to pin-point exactly what a UN strategic 
objective would be. When a UN informant (B 16.01.2013) was asked what the current 
position of the UN was in Somalia, he answered: “I am not sure the UN has a position.” The 
complex system of agencies within the UN bureaucracy, with different leaderships, combined 
with Security Council actors which have the final say, makes it reasonable to question 
whether the UN as a whole has a clear objective for its engagement in Somalia.  
The mandate of AMISOM has from the outset been to support the Transitional Federal 
Institutions in Somalia;  
[…] in their efforts towards the stabilisation of the country and the furtherance of 
dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; 
and to create conditions conducive for long term reconstruction and development 
(AMISOM 2012a: 4) 
While AMISOM has engaged in war fighting with al-Shabaab, counterterrorism does not 
seem to be the overarching goal of the operation. An informant in AMISOM (L 29.01.2013) 
puts it this way: “We will win the war only when I see the government respecting the 
constitution and being inclusive.” The objective of stabilizing the country can be related to 
regional self-interest, while the instability of Somalia has had large regional consequences. 
Kenya currently hosts the world’s largest refugee camp with Somali refugees; there have also 
been several attacks by al-Shabaab both in Kenya and Uganda, and Somalia has been 
described as “a front in a proxy war” between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Woldemichael 2011:5). A 
more indirect objective, as stated by AMISOM representatives, is to demonstrate African 
capability and leadership in affairs on the African continent.  
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We are creating a precedent for what peace enforcement should look like. […] The 
interesting experience with this operation is that this is African led, African owned. 
[…] We have received support from western countries and we are most grateful, but 
this [an African led operation] is what works. (Informant L 29.01.2013) 
The representative goes on to mention that the experiences of AMISOM in Somalia are being 
reviewed by actors involved in Mali. The informant predicts a future where AU operations in 
Africa can become the new and improved standard peace operations. Although the mission 
has cost the lives of many African soldiers, it should not be forgotten that soldiers and states 
have benefited economically from the fact that Western countries have put money into 
African security and defence. This creates some economic motivation for AMISOM, its 
soldiers and the participating countries to continue deploying soldiers. Thus, the case of 
AMISOM shows that engagement based on self-interest also can be connected to goals of 
demonstrating capacity and capability. Still, we should bear in mind that the countries 
actively involved in AMISOM are countries in the same region, whose national security can 
be threatened as a result of Somali instability. 
As for the greater African Union, the strategic objectives of the IGAD countries can be linked 
to the need for regional stabilization. However, many informants pointed out the interests of 
neighbouring countries Kenya and Ethiopia as complicating factors. Both these countries have 
substantial Somali populations, and there has been fear within these countries of a ‘Greater 
Somalia’ policy (Woldemichael 2011: 7). In addition, the Kenyans may have benefited hugely 
from the uncontrolled trade over the Somali border. One diplomat (Informant Q 09.02.2013) 
explained: “Sugar is smuggled into Kenya through Kismayo. It is coming in illegally, not 
being taxed. If it were to stop, Kenya would run out of sugar in a day.” Another diplomat 
agreed that smuggling was taking place: “Sugar in normal times. Now there will be Kenyan 
elections in March, which means money [is smuggled in] for the campaigns, and possibly 
weapons for after the results.” This suggests that both countries have considerable interests in 
keeping a friendly local administration in the Jubaland region which borders on their 
countries, and it has led many to describe the situation as Kenya and Ethiopia needing a 
‘buffer zone’ in Somalia. A UN employee (Informant E 18.01.2013) says: “Kenya has said 
themselves that they want a ‘buffer zone’ to enable the refugees to go back.” Senior 
researcher Morten Bøås explains that a great fear for Ethiopia is that the Ogaden Liberation 
Front in Ethiopia would gain access to the sea. As the Kenyans historically have had a strong 
relationship with the Ogaden, Kenyan security is a slap in the face for Ethiopian security 
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(Bøås 2013, seminar discussions at FAFO). However, relations between the countries have 
improved.  
In 2012 IGAD developed a Grand Stabilization Plan for south-central Somalia. One of the 
central tasks of the plan is the establishment of local administration in Somalia (IGAD 2013). 
An informant (D 17.01.2013) connected to IGAD describes Kenya and Ethiopia as 
dominating actors within IGAD with the potential of driving IGAD initiatives in the 
directions of their own benefits. This informant explained that after Kenya and Ethiopia 
entered Somalia with military forces in the region of Jubaland, they needed an umbrella under 
which they could operate. They therefore adopted the IGAD Stabilization Plan, and developed 
a ‘Jubaland initiative’ under it. “The Jubaland initiative was technically led by IGAD, but 
practically led by Kenya and Ethiopia” (ibid). Kenya and Ethiopia also took central positions 
in the forming of the Joint Committee which would drive the IGAD Stabilization Plan. 
Informant D mentioned several problems in this process. First, the committee was chaired by 
Kenyans and Ethiopians – and not by Somalis; second there were no other IGAD countries 
present; third the committee was dominated by representatives of Somali origins – who could 
be suspected to have clan interests; and forth on the Kenyan side the work was led by people 
from security agencies. Regarding the latter point the informant explained his view on the 
IGAD Stabilization Plan and the Jubaland initiative as follows:  
In my view this is not a security problem per se. This is a political problem. […] We 
are talking about issues of development and governance. […] When the new Somali 
president wanted to be briefed, he asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya. 
However, they had been side-lined by the Kenyan intelligence service and the national 
defence. They did not know anything about what was being done.  
This suggests that national interest is not only a decisive factor in explaining what IGAD sees 
as problems and main goals: national security concerns can also lead to securitization of 
issues that are not necessarily security issues per se, such as the question of local governance. 
This is in line with constructivist thought on the securitization of issues, as defined by Stokke 
(2011:329). 
In conclusion, the actors involved in Somalia seem largely driven by self-interest, reflecting 
to large extent realist perceptions of international relations. In the case of the United States the 
role of national interest seems to be particularly clear. Still, the engagement of actors through 
multinational organizations should be interpreted in a wider theory framework. 
Intergovernmental explanations then seem best suited. In the case where actors are 
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multinational organizations, agendas can be driven by strong actors with vested interests, as 
seems to be the case in IGAD. This is also to some extent the case for the AU where the 
countries in the Horn of Africa have shown greater leadership and initiative. Still, we should 
note that neither Kenya nor Ethiopia played a major role in AMISOM from the start. Such an 
absence from the scene of neighbouring states with questionable interest could be attributed to 
the need to establish legitimacy for the operation. Organizations can also be driven by a 
common agenda, which seems to be the case regarding the EU. At last, it is not to be 
forgotten that intergovernmental organizations can suffer from lack of capability in forming a 
clear, joint strategic objective. In the UN, the organizational structure itself and the high 
number of member states influencing it creates a complex bureaucracy through which policies 
are directed. Although mandates are given and objectives are stated, it is difficult to grasp 
whether the UN really has a clear objective for its engagement in Somalia.  
5.2 Actors’ objectives inside Somalia  
Despite differences in strategic objectives we can observe convergence regarding the goals 
actors set for Somalia itself. During fieldwork it became clear that the overall objective actors 
have for Somalia is that the country is stabilized, creating room for some sort of security – the 
nature of which will be discussed in section 5.5. In spite of concerns raised as to the motives 
of Ethiopia and Kenya, it seems that also these countries wish for stabilization in some form, 
as portrayed through the initiatives the two countries showed in taking on the IGAD 
Stabilization Plan. Looking further into actors’ current objectives, we can observe that a 
common goal seems to have developed since September 2012. In short, there is agreement on 
the need to support the new, current government among staff in the UN, the EU, the United 
States, the AU and IGAD. Often mentioned in the same breath is the need for security sector 
reform, meaning the need for the development of a Somali police, Somali security forces and 
other rule-of-law institutions. These goals can be linked to an understanding of the principal 
problem of Somalia as being the lack of effective rule and government institutions.  
Support for the government is here treated as an objective actors have, because the strong 
wish to support the government which actors display implies a certain degree of detachment 
regarding which policies this support will result in. Based on the interviews conducted, it 
seems fair to argue that actors in general are saying ‘we wish to support the government in all 
they do’ and not ‘we wish to support the government because they will do x, y and z’. As the 
46 
 
support for the new government represents the clearest development in actors’ objectives for 
Somalia, and because this support can be judged somewhat more controversial than a general 
objective of establishing stability, the discussion here will focus upon this.  
The election of President Hassan Sheik has been met with positive responses from the 
international community. Of the 18 diplomats, academics, higher officials and aid workers 
interviewed for this thesis, 17 expressed a positive attitude towards the new government and a 
new, genuine sense of optimism. These numbers can by no means be generalized, but they do 
demonstrate that there has been a shift in the international community towards more 
optimism. However, most interviewees also underlined the many tasks that remain to be done. 
The shift in attitudes following the presidential election seems to have created a new joint 
agenda, namely to give lead to the new government, to support central institution building 
under the new government, and to support the new government’s initiatives. The initiatives 
are based on a six-pillar structure carved out by the elected president Hassan Sheik Mohamud. 
From the six pillars he has defined three pillars as first priorities; security, judiciary and 
public financed management (Informant M 30.01.2013). In parallel the president wishes to 
build 5 small projects in 72 districts: a school, a well, a police station, a health centre and a 
local administrative building. An EU diplomat (Informant M) expressed his consent to this 
approach by stating: “This is exactly what we think it is reasonable to start with.” 
When talking of the current objectives for Somalia, representatives from various actors 
directly and indirectly stated their desire to support the current government. These are only 
some of their statements:  
A US diplomat (Informant N 31.01.2013):  
On the agenda now is capacity building. Of national security forces, and of the Somali 
government, so that they can create credibility and show that they are able to provide 
services. AMISOM has created some space – let’s do something about it. So far the 
momentum is good – it seems like it is all coming together. There is genuine hope with 
the new government. 
EU diplomats:  
In order to make the need go away you are going to have to build a state. The EU from 
a political perspective is very interested in building the administration, the local and 
the federal. I do not think the EU will do this directly, but we have a lot of money for 
those who will do it (Informant Q 09.02.2013). Stability, including security sector 
reform is one of the main interests for us (Informant M 30.01.2013). 
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A UN employee (Informant E 18.01.2013):  
There are a range of issues to be done. Local governance structures must be set up, 
There must be created some sort of trust in the government providing security rather 
than armed groups and clan militias. The government must become able to deliver 
services and health care, and there must be a process of truth and reconciliation. 
An AMISOM officer (Informant L 29.01.2013): 
Governance is at the heart of everything. The priority is governance and rule of law. 
Building all-inclusive institutions and providing services. Then we must begin the 
process of healing and reconciliation. 
An IGAD employee, Somali Facilitation Office (Informant O 01.02.2013):  
The lead role now is played by the Somali government. Our office needs to define its 
role again. We must support and assist the new government in real institution 
building. 
These quotes show actors’ positive attitudes towards the new government, and the weight 
actors put on institution building. This is an interesting observation for several reasons. First, 
because it is a significant breach compared to the general attitude towards the former 
Transitional Federal Government. Second, because this shows the weight actors put on central 
institution building. Not only do actors underline the need for such institutions, but an 
institutional change in itself is what has brought around a change in attitudes and a new 
optimism. This is interesting because it demonstrates that actors put much weight on 
institution building, in line with an ‘institutions first’ approach to state development and 
stabilization. The apparent disadvantage of such an approach is, as reflected on in chapter 
three, the threat of disconnect between an elite responsible for institution building and the 
wider population. Being a country which has repelled attempts on creating a central 
administration for over 20 years, Somalia is likely to be very vulnerable to such a disconnect. 
In her book Networks of Dissolution Simons (1995) analyses the Somali society as culturally 
and tribally fractured creating centrifugal forces which has caused dissolution of the Somali 
state. Building a central Somali administration from the top-down which is accepted by all 
Somalis is therefore not an easy task. 
The use of the ‘4.5’ formula whereby the seats in the parliament are divided equally between 
the four principal clans (the Dir, Darood, Issaq and Hawiye), and whereby the minority clans 
together are given half as many seats as a principal clan, has been an attempt to secure a link 
between the central governance structure and the general population. However, neither 
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appointment to the parliament nor the presidential position in 2012 was subject to popular 
voting. Not all see the ‘4.5’ formula as a sufficient factor ensuring a link between the general 
population and the central administration. An experienced worker from an international NGO 
(Informant H 24.01.2013) stated: “The current government is an absolute mess. Public 
support outside Mogadishu is very limited.” The informant sees the optimism towards the 
new government on behalf of the international community as driven by discourse. “What gets 
funded in Somalia is subject to the discourse of international actors. It has been counter-
terrorism, counter-piracy. Now, it is the new government.” This statement opens up for the 
possibility of seeing policy goals in Somalia as ‘framed’ by the international society. The 
process whereby powerful actors determine how a specific policy is viewed, thus limiting 
critical views on the policy (Bøås and McNeill 2004:1).  
However, international actors themselves can also be subject to rhetorical influence. In 
answering why the presidential election culminated in such a positive international response, 
an EU diplomat (Informant M 30.01.2013) said:  
He [the president] is reasoning straight on what the country has to do. From the six 
pillars, he has chosen three for immediate focus. […] This is an achievement because 
the rhetoric so far has been grand plans and financial schemes to get as much money 
as possible. […] On the other side of the coin: having been involved in civil society, he 
knows how to talk to us.  
This comment shows that also the rhetoric of the president himself has been influential in 
shaping the optimism in the international society.  
Having underlined that supporting the current government seems to have become an objective 
in itself among actors, it is important to note that each mission that has been created for 
Somalia on behalf of actors as the UN, the AU and the EU has a mandate and specific 
objectives they pursue. Which concrete objectives the missions pursue will depend on which 
mandate is given. Consequently, actors will to some extent pursue different objectives, but 
these objectives can all be seen as part of a bigger mutual objective of stability seeking.  
However, because of recent developments, several of these missions are now in a phase of 
uncertainty. While the IGAD Stabilization Office says it has to determine a new role for itself 
(Informant O 01.02.2013), the UN Strategic Review has concluded that UNPOS in its current 
form will cease to exist (What’s in Blue 2013b). Also AMISOM’s future is uncertain, not 
only for financial reasons (this will be discussed in chapter 6), but because the context in 
which they are operating is changing as al-Shabaab have withdrawn from many areas. Actors 
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have seen it as necessary to review the mandates and missions they have assigned, because 
they view the current situation as a significant change in the state of affairs. This is 
particularly evident in the cases of the UN and the AU, where two strategic reviews were 
initiated. 
Thus, what actors see as current objectives in Somalia is in motion. Stability is still an 
objective actors can unite around, but at the same time we are experiencing mission objectives 
in flux and an evolving of agendas. In this situation one of the clearest actor objectives is to 
support the new government and institution building. This corresponds to established theory 
on institution building as highlighted by the ‘institutions-first’ approach. However, as the 
current government is not popularly elected, this also poses questions regarding how actors 
assume that wider stability will be achieved in Somali regions far from the capital.  
5.3 The choice of measures 
This subchapter highlights which measures for stability and securement actors are especially 
concerned with at this phase in Somalia. ‘Measures’ refer to which physical implementations 
or structural changes actors see as the priority when pursuing their objectives. While 
highlighting the heavy weight put on AMISOM and the building of national security forces 
and central institutions, the chapter will also comment on the significance actors are giving to 
more humanitarian measures and to a decentralized approach.  
The actors studied agree to a large extent on which measures one should prioritize at this 
point. The current phase is dominated by a debate on how AMISOM can continue, and how 
and when AMISOM eventually can be phased out and replaced by another mission or by the 
Somali Security Forces (SSF) – all in parallel to the development of the SSF and rule of law 
institutions. Both AMISOM itself and the building of the security forces and institutions can 
essentially be seen as measures used to stabilize and secure the country. As explained in the 
previous section, the weight put on central institution development is significant. However, 
the research has revealed that all actors to some extent value a combination of institutional 
development and humanitarian measures. This is for example demonstrated in the EU 
‘comprehensive approach’ (European Commission 2012a), which proclaims that the EU will 
contribute to the social and economic development of Somalia, in addition to acting on the 
more specific mandate to deter and prevent piracy (EU NAVFOR).  
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A humanitarian issue that gets much attention is the issue of providing basic social services to 
the population. The government and international actors seem to agree on the significance of 
efforts being set in at local levels. There is an agreement on the need to provide social 
services to the population, and there is a wide spread understanding of the need for the 
government to be the provider. This is because the central administration in this way can 
prove their legitimacy out in the districts by showing that they can provide for their citizens. 
As a representative from AMISOM (Informant K 29.01.2013) put it: “If the government 
cannot demonstrate ‘this is what it means to have a government’, then it has a problem.” The 
weight put on provision of services in the districts goes hand in hand with a new attention 
regarding the success of local and regional forms of governance in more stable parts of 
Somalia. In 2010 the United States adopted a ‘dual-track approach’, signifying that there 
should be some recognition for the achievements in more stable regions of Somalia, such as 
Punland and Somaliland, and putting weight on the importance of civil society groups and 
clan leaders (USAID 2011). The US move towards greater focus on the benefits of federalism 
was made in parallel to moves towards a localized focus on behalf of other actors. A diplomat 
from the UK (Informant I 24.01.2013) states that the UK to a slightly greater extent than the 
United States wishes to support localized processes for achieving stability. 
Our view is that areas that have become stabilized in Somalia have done so in a 
localized manner. So what we want to support are localized processes – even at 
village level. We want to try to consolidate some stability and expand upon that. At the 
same time we want to support the national government as well. To some extent like the 
US has done with its dual-track approach. 
These developments are positive from the point of view of theoretical work focusing on 
transformation, where processes are established whereby “actors and institutions affect each 
other in attempts to reform rather than adjust to the relations of power, thus advancing 
towards democracy and peace” (Törnquist 2011:825). However, for the time being it remains 
unclear what these localized processes will look like and when they will be implemented.  
Several interviewees also highlighted that the instability of Somalia and the recruitment to 
extremism has been affected by the lack of job opportunities for young men. However, the 
subject is not necessarily at the top of the agendas. One representative (Informant J 
25.01.2013) from the UN said:  
We discuss job creation, but you will not see it in the Secretary General’s report. 
Economic development is an area the UN needs to focus more on. But it is not as if we 
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are getting pressure from the Security Council. It does not get the amount of attention 
as it should. 
Youth unemployment is one of the factors that are widely accepted to be of importance when 
it comes to preventing recruitment to extremist groups. This is for example shown in the 
research on Somalia by Bjørgo and Gjeldsvik (2012:7). The fact that a UN employee calls for 
larger commitment in this field, is therefore an interesting observation. A lack of initiative in 
this field can provoke questions regarding how concerned actors really are in implementing 
measures locally instead of centrally.  
Based on the discussion of strategic objectives in section 5.1 it seems plausible to ask whether 
the measures actors give significance to regarding the development inside Somalia are in line 
with their greater strategic objectives. More specifically one could ask if the apparent focus on 
local initiatives is genuine. One EU diplomat (Informant Q 09.02.2013) explains it this way:  
If I had to play the devil’s advocate and agree with the critics, I would say; nothing 
has changed. We still maintain the same interests. We will go on with Atalanta. The 
US will go on and try to limit the expansion of fundamentalism and Islamism. As will 
Kenya and Ethiopia [continue to pursue their interests]. But, this new situation allows 
us to do all this a bit closer to what Somali intellectuals define as the problem. 
Because of the stability, we are now able to move on to addressing the root causes. 
Building on this description, one can conclude that strengthening local structures is not first 
priority for actors as the EU and the United States. However, the new phase Somalia has 
entered allows the actors to be more concerned with such issues. Interestingly enough the 
statement demonstrates that even though one has been aware that there are root causes to be 
dealt with, these root causes have not been the primary target for polices. Combined with the 
large focus on AMISOM, Atalanta, institution-building and security sector reform, this 
indicates that actors first and foremost have sought to implement stability from the top and 
down, instead of working from the bottom and up through localized processes. Preceding in 
this manner is in line with the institution first approach, in which one prioritizes strengthening 
the rule of law and state capacity over democracy (Törnquist 2011:823), but contradicts ideas 
of transformation which highlights the need for building local capacity (ibid). Such an 
approach also contradicts basic assumptions of complexity theory which assumes that external 
agents have limited possibilities to gain knowledge of complex social systems (de Coning 
2013:4), and that the top-down introduction of models enhancing stability therefore is likely 
to fail.  
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To sum up, the actors seem to agree to a large extent on which measures it is important to 
prioritize at this point. They wish to implement a wide range of measures focusing on the 
development of local and federal governance structures, and security sector reform in parallel 
to the providing of services to the population. Through interviews representatives from 
different actors agreed to a large extent on the range of root causes that needed to be 
addressed and which broader measures that were necessary. Weight is given both to 
centralized and decentralized measures, but there seems to be more focus on centralized 
measures as institution building and security sector reform. This creates uncertainty regarding 
whether processes will be put in place to facilitate for a transformation process in Somalia.  
At the same time, similar attitudes do not necessarily lead to coherence and joint efforts in 
policymaking and implementation. Financial capacities and maybe ultimately the actor’s will 
to invest time, money or personnel can affect what each actor contributes with at the end of 
the day. This will be further discussed in chapter 6.  
5.4 Perceptions of al-Shabaab – implications for 
counter-terrorism measures   
The theory chapter debates how differing perceptions of a terrorist group can affect which 
measures an actor will use to put an end to the violence. Two types of strategies are outlined 
in line with the work of Lederach (2012:7); those of isolation and engagement. This section 
will compare the differing views on al-Shabaab found among informants. It should be noted 
that the informants’ views shared here might be influenced by their personal stances, and are 
not necessarily official views expressed on behalf of the actors. However, this is of less 
significance as the point is to highlight that differences in perceptions exists and that these 
have significance when considering whether it could be an option to negotiate with al-
Shabaab.  
Informants’ views on al-Shabaab extend between two extremes; to look at al-Shabaab a solely 
local Somali problem of despaired, jobless and war-ridden youth, and to see it as an 
international terrorist organization. Following these two perceptions is the notion that al-
Shabaab is a pure local or global problem. While no actor takes either of these extreme 
positions, informants do hold differing perceptions on what al-Shabaab really is. An 
interesting analogy was given by an AMISOM informant (K 29.01.2013) who compared the 
organization to an onion:  
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The al-Shabaab is a wing of a global Islamic movement whose objective is to put the 
entire world under strict sharia rule. They believe this is non-negotiable. Composition 
of the organization is like an onion, it has layers. There are those who are fascinated, 
there are those who are there for economic gains. There are those who are coerced or 
manipulated. But some believe they are God’s messengers, crusaders in their own 
right. This is the core of al-Shabaab. 
The statement is interesting because it places the global aspect of al-Shabaab at the core. It 
will therefore in the following be called the international core-view. This core assumption 
will have implications for whether the actor sees an engagement strategy, in Lederach’s 
terms, as a possible counter-terror measure. The AMISOM informant explains his view: 
There have been those who renounce violence. As long as you renounce violence we 
will talk to you. Some of these will be low level, some high level [within the 
organization]. […]  For those at the core it is unthinkable to negotiate. 
We should be careful to conclude from this that AMISOM would pressure against 
negotiations with al-Shabaab if the government wished to enter into some kind of 
negotiations. However, we should neither assume that the perceptions of actors inside the 
mission are without significance. It is therefore interesting to compare this view to the view of 
other informants. 
An EU informant (Q 09.02.2013) explains that the general European view is that one should 
talk to whoever is willing to talk, but that a conversation with some of the extreme Islamists 
in al-Shabaab is not going to be constructive. He explains the ideal approach like this:  
Politics should always lead, and the military should follow. Political change should be 
reducing the issue, picking off the pieces that can be dealt with until you have got the 
one piece you cannot deal with left. Then you deal with that piece on its own [using 
other measures, as military]. I think that is the approach to Shabaab. 
This can be regarded as another way of seeing the al-Shabaab organization as an organization 
with layers. Not necessarily by looking at the extreme Islamists as the core and the heart of 
the organization, but by looking at them as the one piece you cannot deal with through 
political means. I will call this the political-military piece view. Such a view could seem 
strikingly similar to the first, but when it comes to possibilities for negotiating with al-
Shabaab as a group – the two views imply quite different possibilities. While both views 
highlight that there are al-Shabaab members that could be reintegrated into society, the 
international core-view presupposes that the heart of the organization is made up by actors 
that will not negotiate. An actor holding such a view will hardly press for negotiations with 
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the al-Shabaab as a group, as they believe the ones in control will not want this. The actor is 
thus likely to choose isolation over engagement. In comparison the political-military piece 
view says nothing about which of the pieces of the organization that is really in charge, it 
merely supposes that there are separate entities that has to be dealt with differently. This will 
theoretically imply that conducting negotiations with the organization remains an option if 
certain leader figures are part of a political piece of the organization. In this way, the choice 
between isolation and engagement remains open and subject to evaluation. 
However, there are other factors than mere perceptions that decide politics. A UN employee 
(Informant E 18.01.2013) notes that the listing of al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization, by 
actors such as the United States and the EU, creates problems for negotiations.  
[This] means in effect that any official from these countries or the UN cannot engage 
directly with al-Shabaab, even if it is about peace-making. If they had decided to come 
to the table to negotiate a peace agreement it is a big question of whether the UN 
would be allowed to negotiate with them. 
The quote shows that single actors’ views and perceptions can have large systemic 
consequences, as it disables the one international actor – the UN – which many countries 
pursue their policies through. Since much funding to Somalia goes through the UN system 
and the many actors engage politically and diplomatically through the UN, the binding of the 
UN is the binding of many.  
Lederach (2012:7) attributes such listing policy specifically to the isolation strategy as it 
identifies individuals that can be targeted with military measures. In addition he claims the 
policy works directly against engagement, as it legally withholds other actors to engage with 
the listed groups (ibid). Among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and in civil society 
there have been strong reactions towards both the implications of the listing of al-Shabaab as 
a terrorist organization and towards the counter-terrorist approach that central actors support. 
NGO informant H (24.01.2013) expressed clear criticism of both the United States and the 
UN; stressing that counterterror legislation is destructive for peacebuilding efforts: 
It is impossible to negotiate with al-Shabaab today. One is not allowed a number of 
things because of the legislation. This legislation is in force all over the world. US 
legislation has extraterritorial effects. […] The UN should not moan about it. They 
should change it. They are part of that legislation. 
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The representative draws a quite different image than other actors when describing what the 
al-Shabaab as an organization really is, highlighting the historical aspects of Islamism as a 
Somali phenomenon inside an otherwise quite moderate Islam state.  
It is practically impossible to wipe out al-Shabaab. They are part of the whole 
structure. Since the 70s movements like this has come and gone, and adapted to the 
environment at the time. In the 80s it was al-Itihaad. The Soviets struck them 
militarily, and they went back under. Then some of them came back as the ICU. When 
Ethiopia sent forces into Somalia, the ICU went back under. Some of the people from 
ICU are now in al-Shabaab. It is a Somali thing. How are you supposed to stamp out 
something that is so profoundly a part of the Somali society? How beat it militarily? 
You cannot! 
This statement is interesting as it draws a quite different image than the international core 
view of al-Shabab. Based on such a historical view the nature of al-Shabaab is described as 
genuinely Somali.  
The historical view makes the matter of negotiation and engagement more feasible as a policy 
option. On the question of what international actors should do in the matter of dealing with al-
Shabaab, the NGO representative answers: 
There is no room for peacebuilding organizations. They [international actors] can 
make it possible to sit down and talk to al-Shabaab. The time will come when you have 
to negotiate with them, if not now – then in thirty years. We must find out what they 
really want, but why wait for another thirty years? 
Based on a historical view of al-Shabaab, engagement seems not only more obtainable – as 
the organization is seen as a locally rooted phenomenon – but also more necessary. 
Negotiation seems necessary, in this perspective, because the rise of Islamist groupings in 
Somalia is seen as a recurring event only temporarily interrupted by various military 
interventions from outside actors. The writings of journalist Mary Harper can be used to 
support such a view. Harper reflects on a series of issues that are of interest. Having explained 
that Somalis have generally practiced a tolerant and moderate type of Sunni Islam, Harper 
(2012:74-76) says that there are precedents for violent political Islam in Somalia, the earliest 
example being Seyyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan’s jihad against colonial forces in the 
twentieth century.  
Thus, differing views as to what al-Shabaab is can lead to differing views on the possibility of 
negotiating with the group and therefore also differences in what actors perceive as policy 
options. Fundamental questions that remain are how the organization in itself is built up, who 
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the leaders are and how much power these leaders have over the organization. These are 
important questions while were it to be the case that the leadership is clearly internationalist 
jihadist, it will reduce hopes of success of an engagement strategy. Harper (2012:86) notes 
that al-Shabaab is such a secretive movement that it is difficult to establish exactly what it is 
fighting for and who its leaders are. “Both its ideology and its leadership appear to change 
fairly regularly (ibid).” However, in March 2011 Harper secured a telephone appointment 
with the Islamist leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, and she asked what al-Shabaab was 
fighting for. Aweys answered (Harper 2012:88): 
We are fighting for three reasons. First, our country has been invaded. Secondly, we 
are being prevented from practicing our religious beliefs. Thirdly, we are fighting 
against those who are blocking the interests of our people by preventing them from 
establishing an Islamic government. 
If these are the reasons of Aweys’ support for Somali jihad, it does not come forward as non-
negotiable terms. Aweys further explained the organization’s relationship to al-Qaida in this 
way: 
We share a way of thinking with al-Qaida, but as our country has been militarized for 
so long, we don’t need any outside help. Al-Shabaab does not have an administrative 
relationship with al-Qaida. 
This statement counters an international core-view on Somalia, as it underlines the 
independence of al-Shabaab from its ‘brother-organization’.  
Taking Aweys’ statements into account it is interesting to review the views of one of the 
strongest actors in the counterterror field, the United States. A US diplomat (Informant N 
31.01.2013) speaking on the issue of possibilities for negotiation with al-Shabaab said the 
following: 
There are two al-Shabaabs. The first is the global jihad group. Those would never be 
willing to negotiate. […] The second group keep their eyes wide open. They work with 
al-Shabaab, some as financial supporters. […] A Camp David agreement with al-
Shabaab is not going to happen, but the bulk of al-Shabaab is already being 
reconciled through the clans. […] Success will not come through negotiations with 
Shabaab, but with gradual change. It is a waste of time talking to the hardcore guys, 
but we must also win over 18-year-olds in need of a job. Some may be worked up when 
Hassan Sheik makes statements on the need to reconcile, but the serious policymakers 
understand the need for this. The hard question is if somebody we perceive as a threat 
would reach out to Hassan Sheik. I do not see that happening. Maybe you could see 
someone like Aweys in negotiations. I do not know our official line on this.  
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This statement is interesting because it proposes that reconciliation and negotiation is 
something which will happen at a low-policy level, through the clans. This might be a correct 
description of what has happened so far, but at the same time the view seem to exclude the 
possibility of a public negotiation process led by central leader figures in al-Shabaab. The 
statement is also interesting as it displays the intrinsic dilemma of what would happen if a 
leader figure as Aweys actually wanted to come to the table to negotiate in the open. 
Although the diplomat underlines the right of the president Hassan Sheik to reconcile with 
former extremists it is clear that a situation where prominent figures seek open negotiations 
would constitute a dilemma.  
The fieldwork has thus shown that, among the actors in the international community, views 
differ as to what al-Shabaab is. An international core view, a historical view or a political-
military pieces view will have different implications when it comes to the matter of whether 
or not an actor would encourage an engagement strategy. The nature of an engagement 
strategy could also be disputed. While some highlight that reconciliation with terrorists – to 
the extent that it can be done – will be a low-level process, others disagree. A Somali scholar 
(Informant G 22.01.2013) expressed a clear view on the matter. He firmly claimed:  
The government of today has to negotiate with al-Shabaab. There is a less extremist 
element in al-Shabaab. They need to talk to them. This is essential to establish peace 
and security. 
The statement is not necessarily contrary to the statements of the US representative, as also he 
said that Hassan Sheik is in his right to seek reconciliation with former extremists. However, 
there are differences as to what actors assume to be the core, who is assumed to be willing to 
negotiate and which form one is willing to let this negotiation process take. Using Lederach’s 
theory of change we see that while a political-military piece view and a historical view imply 
possibilities for engagement, an there is little probability that actors with an international core 
view will use such strategies. Rather, these are likely to use strategies of isolation, which is 
what has featured counterterror work in Somalia up until now. 
5.5 The referent object 
Having written about the strategic objectives of actors, the more imminent objectives for 
actors’ engagement in Somalia and the measures actors emphasize, it seems reasonable to 
then ask; what exactly is being secured through the actors’ engagement? As presented in the 
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theory chapter this is a question of an actor’s referent object as described by Buzan, Wæver 
and de Wilde (1998:36). 
Literature on security studies highlights how the thought on referent objects have changed and 
evolved over time (Collins 2010:2). In the case of the policies of the AU, the EU, IGAD, the 
United States and the UN in Somalia the previous discussions have highlighted objectives 
related to both national security and the stability of Somalia. In addition weight has been put 
on both providing social services to the people and supporting the central administration in 
Somalia in institution building. There are thus a number of facts that can support various 
arguments regarding what should be assumed as the referent object in Somalia. It is possible 
to claim that the referent object is the Somali state, as much weight is given to central 
institution building. The focus on humanitarian measures, dual tracks and provision on basic 
services to the Somali people could support the argument that the Somali population is 
targeted as the referent object. At the same time, one can argue that the referent object is the 
actor itself. It is for example clear that the EU wishes to secure its member states and the 
European population when directing policies and finances towards Somalia. This draws a 
complex image of what is being secured through actors’ policies. 
The first conclusion that must be drawn from this is that it seems strict to claim that a policy 
can have only one referent object. Rather, one actor can have multiple referent objects when 
pursuing its policies. There appears to be no doubt concerning the fact that the United States 
and its inhabitants are referent objects for US policies in Somalia, as a primary concern for 
the United States is the fear of the Somali terrorist threat spreading internationally. Likewise 
it seems clear that European states and inhabitants are referent objects for the EU’s policies. 
At the same time, it is obvious that the action of these actors is affecting the security situation 
within Somalia. It is clear that their policies – regardless of which original intentions lay 
behind it – affects what is being secured in Somalia. A parallel securement of national 
interests and securement of something within Somalia must be said to be present in the actions 
of all regional and international actors directing security policies towards Somalia. This is not 
very surprising as such a double securement process is a logical consequence when assuming 
that self-securement and self-interest is primary. Still a double securement process requires 
that one assumes that the security policies implemented abroad will have implications for the 
local security situation – something which seems natural to assume.  
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Moving on from describing the actor itself or the member states’ citizens as referent objects, it 
is interesting to discuss what exactly is being secured within Somalia. An imminent question 
seems to be whether human security or state security is being promoted, the two possibilities 
respectively implying that the human being or the state itself is being targeted as the referent 
object. Looking at the sum of actors’ policies discussed in sections 5.2 and 5.3 it is obvious 
that considerable attention is given to securing central institutions and the Somali 
government. This clearly favours a view of the Somali state as a referent object, and is in line 
with traditional thought on referent objects as described by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 
(1998:36).  
The mandate given to AMISOM is one supporting factor in this regard. AMISOM is based on 
a mandate to secure the transitional federal state institutions – not the people (Informant L 
29.01.2013). Although the mission mandate is to conduct peace support operations in Somalia 
“in order to create conditions for the conduct of Humanitarian activities and an immediate 
take over by the United Nations (UN)” (AMISOM 2012a), the mandate does not speak 
specifically of the protection of civilians. Rather, the mandate includes providing protection to 
the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs); supporting dialogue and reconciliation, assisting 
in the implementation of the National Security Stabilization Programme (NSSP); supporting 
disarmament and stabilization efforts; monitoring the security situation; facilitating for 
humanitarian operations including repatriation of refugees and internally displaced, and 
finally, protecting AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self-defence 
(ibid). One AMISOM officer (Informant L 29.01.2013) says he remember this fact being 
debated, and explains that although the forces will do what they can to protect civilians this 
cannot be their mandate because they then would encounter a difficult dilemma as to who 
they should choose to protect. They simply do not have enough soldiers to protect the general 
population, and could be accused of taking side by protecting some. It thus seems 
unquestionable that although one may assume that the mission has a positive effect on human 
security, the referent object of AMISOM’s involvement is the central institutions.  
Prioritizing to secure central institutions is in line with considering the state as a referent 
object. However, as the Somali state is extremely fragile, and the central institutions so far are 
instruments for the sitting government which are not well connected with the regions, an 
interesting question is whether actors supporting central institution building and protection are 
targeting the sitting regime more than the state in itself as a referent object. As mentioned in 
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chapter three, regime security is one of the few perceptions challenging the state or the human 
being as referent objects. Regime security is typically adopted as a strategy within weak states 
by weak states elites (Jackson 2010:184). This type of security is “the condition where 
governing elites are secure from violent challenges to their rule”, and differs from state 
security which is “the condition where the institutions, processes and structures of the state 
are able to continue functioning effectively, regardless of the make-up of the ruling elite” 
(Jackson 2010:187). However, in a weak state, as Somalia, state security is to a high extent 
connected to the sitting regime as the current government and central governing bodies to a 
certain extent is the only central structure the state possesses. For the time being, the 
protection of central institutions does not amount to much other than the protection of the 
government and the few bodies around it. The real test as to whether support for these bodies 
is a measure for securing the state or the regime will come with time.  
Another aspect to consider is what will happen with AMISOM’s mandate now that the war-
fighting has lessened, and al-Shabaab has retreated, fled or hid in remote parts of the country. 
The civilian component of AMISOM is very weak compared to its military component, and 
several of the interviewed representatives claim it needs to be strengthened. Informant P 
(01.02.2013) also confirmed that there is interest within the AU in strengthening this 
component. This could mean a change in the mission mandate from the focusing on the state 
or regime as the object to be secured to incorporate a stronger human security aspect. At the 
same time, an EU diplomat (Informant Q 09.02.2013) highlights that what is needed now is 
not military to defeat the terrorists but a police force to ensure that citizens live in a society 
with law and order. I asked the diplomat whether it was a challenge for AMISOM – which up 
until now has had a military focus – that the peace enforcement mission is coming to a 
different stage where military battles are less usual. He answered:  
Yes, it is a challenge for all peacekeeping. It is as true for UN peacekeeping as for 
African. If you go to the international community and say you need 20 000 people to 
deal with problems in the DRC, you get 20 000 soldiers. What you actually need is 
18 000 policemen and 2000 soldiers. […] What a large part of Somalia now needs is 
more policemen. 
A change in deployment of forces or a change in the mandate for AMISOM itself could imply 




Humanitarian policies can be seen as means for creating human security. Chapter three 
presented two definitions of human security, the narrow definition focusing on freedom from 
violence and threat and the broad definition focusing on freedom from want. Building on Kerr 
(2010:127) and her causal model of human security which connects the broad and the narrow 
definitions; humanitarian policies can be regarded as policies which increase human security 
in all forms. This is because humanitarian measures will increase human security in the broad 
form, which in turn – according to Kerr (ibid) – increases human security in the narrow term. 
Considering humanitarian policies as a contribution to human security opens up for seeing a 
range of actors as treating the Somali population as referent objects. 
The EU has a UN Security Council mandate to protect shipping off the coast of Somalia. The 
mandate involves: 
[T]he protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid 
to displaced persons in Somalia; the protection of African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) shipping; the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and 
armed robbery off the coast of Somalia; the protection of vulnerable shipping off the 
Somali coast on a case by case basis (EU NAVFOR).  
The protection of shipping in the Gulf of Aden is in the EU’s self-interest. More than 15 % of 
global trade passes through the Gulf of Aden annually, and this includes a significant part of 
European energy and commodity supplies and exports (Helly 2009:394). However, the 
initiation of Operation Atalanta was based UN concerns over the need to protect World Food 
Programme shipments, as clearly stated in Security Council resolution 1838 (UNSC 2008), 
and reflected in the French answer to the call from the UN which initiated the operation (AFP 
2007). The operation can thus in parallel be seen as providing security for the EU and as a 
human security measure in Somalia. The EU is also a large actor in Somalia in humanitarian 
terms. Every year, millions of euros are disbursed through the European Commission 
Development Programme (EU Delegation to Kenya, Somalia Unit 2012). The main areas of 
European Commission development cooperation were in 2012 set to be governance, 
education, economic development and food security (European Commission 2012b). Given 
these developmental efforts, the EU can be said to be furthering human security.  
Because of the security situation, the number of actors which have operated directly on the 
ground in Somalia is limited. Many organizations are directing their humanitarian support 
through the few actors that are present. The UN is a strong civil actor through a range of its 
agencies such as the World Food Programme, UNDP and UNICEF. Some UN agencies are 
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among the ones that have been present, although the reminder of the organization has been 
criticized for its lacking presence. Although several actors are involved in humanitarian 
affairs in Somalia, some actors are also criticized for their humanitarian engagement. A 
criticism directed towards US Aid has been that the organization goes in to local communities 
which for long have been isolated, with such great amounts of money, that it is disrupting 
other low scale initiatives and creates hostilities over resources in the local environments 
(Informant I 24.01.2013). The argument that foreign aid can be disruptive for human 
development and security is a well-known argument in the development literature, promoted 
by scholars such as Moyo (2009). This shows that humanitarian action not necessarily implies 
human security. 
In addition, one can question whether the promotion of human security in the broader sense is 
equal to treating human beings as referent objects. Following de Wilde et al. (1998:36) a 
referent object is “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate 
claim to survival”. While certain types of emergency relief with little doubt can be attributed 
to policies where the donor sees the referent object as existentially threatened, this 
consideration casts doubts on whether it would be correct to claim that the Somali population 
is a referent object for security policies if for example an actor contributes humanitarian 
funding to school constructions. Such considerations narrow down the possibility of which 
developmental policies one can view as increasing the security of the Somali population as a 
referent object. Although certain ‘broad school’ humanitarian policies as the provision of 
emergency relief still can be considered as deliberately increasing the human security of a 
referent object, it seems clear that the promotion of human security in the narrow sense is 
closer connected to the treatment of the population as a referent object of security.  
Considering whether there are actors who promote human security in the narrow form inside 
Somalia, it is interesting to observe that the rule of Islamist, fundamentalist groups – and even 
the rule of al Shabaab – in some cases have been described as ensuring some degree of human 
security. In interviewing people from villages under al-Shabaab rule, journalist Mary Harper 
received the following comments from a man living in the al-Shabaab controlled town of 
Jowhar, ninety kilometres north of Mogadishu:  
The first and most important thing I would like to say about life in Jowhar is that there 
is security in the town. There are no bandits or robbers because al-Shabaab would cut 
off their hands or worse if it caught them. The threat of this kind of punishment really 
works. The good security situation means that people are free to move around in 
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Jowhar […]. But freedom of movement is the only type of freedom we have (Harper 
2012: 71-72). 
Also the rule of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 was to some degree appraised because the 
ICU ensured a degree of peace and stability which enabled people to feel safe. However, the 
sense of human security that the ICU or al-Shabaab have assured at certain points in time is 
limited by the groups’ own rules and regulations for what was regarded as legitimate 
behaviour. In the terminology of Isaiah Berlin (see Riley 2008:107) it is possible to say that 
people achieved a negative freedom – a freedom in which one is dependent upon the 
institution imposing the freedom – in its hardest sense. It becomes difficult to agree that the 
ICU ensured human security as the use of punishments under the ICU were breaching what 
the UN defines as human rights. Still it is interesting to observe that law and order was 
established. Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan (2007:4) write this in their paper ‘The Rise and 
Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts’: “The courts achieved the unthinkable, uniting 
Mogadishu for the first time in sixteen years, and re-establishing peace and security.” A 
Somali refugee gives a similar description:  
When the UIC came into the country they made safety and peace for the citizens a 
priority. They made sure that every robber gave up his gun, all the video spots were 
closed, every qat seller stopped selling poison to people, everything was calm and 
quiet. And it was really what the people wanted, after living in war for sixteen years. It 
was like Allah answered all our prayers (Somali quoted in Lindley 2010). 
The consideration that the Islamic Courts were able to impose a degree of human security in 
the country puts the Ethiopian intervention in 2006 in an interesting light, as Ethiopia to a 
large extent received positive response from the international society and the United States 
when it intervened to fight the movement in 2006. Informant N (31.01.2013), a US diplomat, 
confirms that the removal of the courts was in the US interest at the time. Although the ICU 
rule could be described as extremely tough, the fact that they did constitute a stabilizing and 
securing element inside Somalia, points towards the conclusion that outside actors saw their 
own states as primary referent objects and instead of seeing the Somali population as such, in 
this case.  
To sum up, considerable attention is given to securing central institutions and the Somali 
government. AMISOM’s mandate is one example of this. These findings can support the 
conclusion that the actors are treating the Somali state as a referent object. However, it can 
also give rise to the question of whether the regime, more than the state, is treated as a 
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referent object. Here, it should be mentioned that the Somali government seems to have a 
genuine concern to provide for the people of Somalia, and essentially, if human security is to 
be ensured it is necessary to have something more longstanding than an NGO or an 
international organization to ensure this security. The most common source of human security 
is the state itself. While humanitarian measures can be seen to enhance human security, the 
current humanitarian involvement on the part of international actors cannot be considered as 
directed exclusively towards the population as a referent object for security. An expansion of 
AMISOM’s mandate to include a more civilian focus would possibly change this.   
5.6 A similar security perspective 
The analysis in this chapter has shown many similarities in the security perspectives of the 
actors which are analysed. Actors have similar perspectives on which developments should 
take place inside Somalia, although their engagement is steered largely by national interests.  
National interest or self-interest trumps as a decisive factor in explaining why actors engage 
in security political affairs in Somalia. Intergovernmental theory with elements of realist 
thought is well suited to explain how strong actors’ security perspectives can dominate the 
perspectives of the organization, as in the case of Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s dominant role in 
IGAD’s Somalia affairs. However, the case of the EU also clearly shows that states in an 
organization can have shared interests when engaging in security political affairs abroad. 
Intergovernmental theory on two level games highlighting the possibility for actors to use an 
international organization as a legitimizing body (Matlary 2009:93) is well suited to explain 
why strong actors will engage in security policies through multinational organizations. At the 
same time, the case of the UN casts doubts on whether constructivist approaches focusing on 
norm diffusion and the development of a common agenda can explain how an organization’s 
security perspective is formed. The apparent lack of a joint security perspective in an 
organization as diverse as the UN strengthens the assumption that an organization’s security 
perspective is an outcome of a bargaining process.  
The fact that states are pursuing their own interest does not mean that actors are pursuing 
different goals in Somalia, or that they are agitating for the use of dissimilar measures. Actors 
are targeting a multitude of referent objects through a multitude of measures, but to a large 
extent their views concur. The principal referent objects seem to be the actor or the actors’ 
65 
 
member states themselves and the state of Somalia, represented by the current and recently 
elected government. This is in line with traditional perceptions of the state being a primary 
referent object, as highlighted by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:36). This focus upon the 
state is reflected in the goals actors set for their engagement in Somalia, and the measures 
they want to introduce. While actors do focus on the importance of pursuing decentralized 
policies and humanitarian policies, more weight seems to be given to institution building and 
support to the government, amongst all the actors that are analysed. This is in line with 
traditional perceptions of state building, as proclaimed by Mansfield and Snyder (2007); 
highlighting the need for institutions first and claiming that democratic elections first can be 
introduced at a later stage. According to plans, the first general election for the presidential 
position in Somalia is set to take place in 2016 (African Elections Database 2012). The 
enormous focus that has been given to support to the current government blurs the distinction 
between treating the state as a referent object and treating a regime as a referent object. A 
focus on institution-building might be necessary in the Somali case because the state has very 
few governing structures in place. However, a focus upon the building of institutions from 
above must also be considered a warning sign exactly because the society has few governing 
structures. This is because a system implemented from above inhabits the risk of alienating 
the population unless substantial channels for public participation are put into place, in line 
with theory on transformation as promoted by Törnquist (2011). 
An area with somewhat less resemblance between actors is that of how al-Shabaab is 
perceived. The differences found here indicate that there are differences in how actors wish to 
pursue counter-terrorism in Somalia. However, the largest difference was not found between 
the actors but between informants representing the actors and informants from civil society or 
academia. In analysing the statements made by the informants, I detected three different views 
on al-Shabaab, which in turn will entail different prospects regarding whether isolation or 
engagement could be used as a strategy. While the strategy employed up until now has been 
that of isolation, some informants from civil society and academia were clear in their 
judgement that engagement is the only solution to the problem of al-Shabaab violence. A UN 
representative also expressed concern for the lack of possibility for an engagement strategy 
where negotiations were initiated.  
The next chapter discusses whether the shared perspectives on Somalia imply that efforts pull 
in the same direction, creating coherence in policies. 
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6 Analysis of Policy Coherence 
What are the main challenges in achieving a coherent international policy towards Somalia? 
Coherence is defined in chapter three as a situation where actors in the international system 
operate and develop policies so that efforts pull in the same direction. The concept is given 
three dimensions; the technical and the policy dimension, as described by Gebhard 
(2011:106), and the local dimension, as described by de Coning (2012:290). This chapter will 
start by presenting examples of lack on coherence in two specific cases. First, the lack of 
coherence in the case of the AU and UN strategic reviews is discussed to show lack of 
coherence along the technical and policy dimension. Thereafter section 6.2 argues that the 
lack of substantial contact between ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ donors can be a 
problematizing factor for coherence. Section 6.3 analyses whether there is lack of coherence 
along the third, local dimension, and provides an answer to whether lack of local ownership 
can be considered a challenge for policy coherence in the Somali case. Thereafter the thesis 
moves on to discussing whether two other propositions, introduced in chapter three, have 
explanatory power. First, the assumption that more coordination is needed to establish 
coherence is analysed in section 6.4. Second, conceptual work on ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics 
and ‘burden-sharing’ is used to discuss which significance self-interest and actors’ priorities 
should be given when analysing policy coherence in the Somali case.  
Initially, I argued that based on constructivist thought one could assume that differences in 
security perspectives would increase the chances of incoherent policymaking. Likewise, 
similarities in security perspectives would increase the chances of policy coherence. This is 
because constructivist thought gives primary value to actors’ ideas and perceptions, elements 
that are basic to an actors’ security perspective. While chapter five shows that there are great 
similarities in actors’ security perspectives, section 6.1 and 6.2 will show that there is lack of 
policy coherence. Consequently, my initial assumption is proven to be wrong. To answer the 
research question, it is therefore necessary to focus on other possible explanations to the lack 
of policy coherence. This is what is done in sections 6.3 to 6.5. The chapter concludes that 
there is lack of coherence in security policies in Somalia. While the coordination assumption 
is insufficient in explaining the lack of coherence, complexity theory provides useful insights. 
However, the significance of national interest and actors priorities should not be forgotten. 
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6.1 The strategic reviews 
Since AMISOM was established, it has been clear that the mission was supposed to be 
temporary, and that a UN peacekeeping mission was to take over at one point. Wakengela 
(2011:387) writes that the dominant view within the UN – the one shared with major powers 
as the United States – is to wait until conditions are ‘conducive’ to international intervention. 
He writes: “Such conditions have failed to materialize for 14 years”. At the time of the 
fieldwork, a key concern among actors related to where funding for a continued AMISOM 
mission would come from. So far the EU has provided the bulk of the funding through the 
African Peace Facility. An EU diplomat (Informant M 30.01.2013) explained that they have 
made it clear to the AU and to others that they will not be able to continue this funding.  
We will run out of money by the end of March, and we have reserves to July. […] The 
EU is stretched. There was an attempt from the AU to call on twenty of their own 
member states asking for support to complement the EU, but no one responded. Not 
even to say they had received the letter. 
While the funding for AMISOM is running out, the landscape of conflict inside Somalia is 
changing much due to AMISOM’s efforts. At the time of writing, there was no evident 
solution to how a military mission in Somalia could continue. This section will demonstrate 
how the case of the strategic reviews shows lack of coherence both along a technical and a 
policy dimension.  
In 2012 and early 2013 both the UN and the AU decided to conduct strategic reviews. The 
AU strategic review presented three options for a continued mission in Somalia: “Option 1: 
Handover AMISOM to the UN; Option 2: Enhance AMISOM, and; Option 3: Establish a new 
joint AU–UN mission (AMISOM Strategic Review Team 2013: ii).” The Review Team 
argued that the status quo is not tenable, because AMISOM does not currently have enough 
resources available to support the government of Somalia in recovering the entire territory of 
the country in time for the general elections in 2016 (ibid). They therefore concluded:  
As the status quo is not an option, and option 1 (UN peacekeeping) is not feasible at 
this stage, the remaining options are option 2 (enhance AMISOM) and option 3 (a new 
joint AU–UN mission). As option 2 does not provide for sustainable and predictable 
funding for AMISOM, the Review Team therefore recommends option 3 (ibid). 
However, the AU Review Team’s recommendation of altering the mission to a joint one was 
not being coordinated with the recommendation coming out of the UN strategic review.  
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The UN strategic review came up with four options. Of the four, the Secretary-General 
recommended option C – the establishment of a UN Assistance Mission that would replace 
the UN Political Office for Somalia (What’s in Blue 2013a). This option implied that a new 
mission would deliver political and peace-building support. In practical terms UNPOS in 
today’s form would cease to exist and UNSOA would be integrated into the new mission 
(ibid). However, the UN Country Team would remain as a structural separate entity outside 
the new mission, implying that there would still not be one main leadership of the UN 
contributions in Somalia. The other options were a joint AU–UN support operation (option 
A), a fully integrated UN peace-building mission where the Country Team is structurally 
included (option B) and a UN peace-building mission with a separate UNSOA (option D). 
Option A would have been the one closest to the AU recommendation.  
At the time of the fieldwork the reviews were conducted, but not yet official. However, 
several of the informants were well placed and had already read the reviews or documents 
describing them. An EU informant (Informant M 30.01.2013) explained the main problem 
with the reviews: 
Unfortunately there are two reviews. The two come out with options for the way 
ahead. In the headings the options are not dissimilar. The UN has four options – the 
AU has three. In detail the options are very different. 
Informants pointed out that in concrete terms the option of “a united AU–UN mission” did 
not represent the same thing in the two reviews. One informant (M 30.01.2013) claimed that 
the UN idea of a joint structure was “not joint at all” as it left the AU with a military job and 
left the political work and some humanitarian work to the UN. The informant claimed the UN 
would not be sufficiently linked to what was going on, on the ground, stating: “If the military 
command is on one side and the political on another it poses problems” (ibid). Thus, not only 
were the organizations proposing options dealing with different aspects of the international 
engagement in Somalia, but on the one option that was on the paper for both organizations the 
implications of the option was not really similar.  
Informants also expressed disappointment over the fact that the work was not more closely 
coordinated. The EU diplomat explains: “My impression is that the AU was ready to do a 
joint review with the UN, while the UN was not” (ibid). The fact that the reviews were not 
ready at the same time for consideration in the Security Council which holds the power, 
illustrates the lack of coordination between the reviews. On the 14
th
 of February the Security 
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Council received a briefing on Somalia by Assistant-Secretary-General for Political Affairs 
Tayé Brook Zerihoun. Zerihoun then presented the Secretary General’s latest report on 
Somalia which treated the four options of the Strategic Review. The internet magazine What’s 
in blue which provides knowledge on the work of the Security Council wrote the day before 
the briefing: 
Another area where Council members may be looking for more clarity is on the 
process surrounding the AU’s strategic review of AMISOM as there seems to be some 
frustrations that the AU still has not submitted its report on this to the Security 
Council. It seems the AU Peace and Security Council is not scheduled to meet until 27 
February to discuss the outcome of the review and only after that will the AU report 
be forwarded to the Council. This will not leave much time for Council members, who 
are likely to have already started negotiations on a draft resolution, to take into 
account any requests from the AU relating to AMISOM before the current Council 
authorisation of the mission expires on 7 March (What’s in Blue 2013a). 
This shows that the UN Security Council had very little time to take into account the views of 
the AU strategic review before deciding on which route the organization was to take forward. 
As the AU mission AMISOM is completely dependent on the UN mandate it is noteworthy 
that the two organizations did not manage to find a solution so that opinions from both 
reviews were heard before decisions were taken. As the preferred option by the AU Review 
Team was closest to the UNs option A, a decision in which the UN discarded option A (in its 
own review) would in practise be the same as discarding the preferred option of the AU 
Review Team without having read the arguments of why this option was preferred by the AU. 
The example fits Gebhard’s (2011:124) description of lack of coherence along the technical 
dimension where procedural problems can occur because of difficulties in reconciling 
different channels of policymaking.  
It is worth underlining that all other actors seemed to want a joint review which would set the 
scene for the continued international engagement in Somalia. An EU diplomat (Informant Q 
09.02.2013) explains that the AU expressed wishes on producing a joint report, but that this 
was not a wish from the UN: 
What the AU wanted was at worst to get to a point where they both had finished their 
reviews and then to produce at least complementary reports to the Security Council. 
[…] The UN does not want a joint report because their report is about the internal 
affairs – it is not really about Somalia. 
The fact that the UN review is about the internal structure of the UN bodies dealing with 
Somalia was demonstrated through the debate between the actors in the Security Council. 
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Much of the debate concerned whether the UN Somalia should be one entity under one 
SRSG, or whether it should keep its structure having different leaders for the humanitarian, 
Country Team section and the political missions. On 28 February the independent organ 
Security Council Report published the March Monthly Forecast. They then wrote that there 
seemed to be a wide range of views among Council members. 
[M]ost favor either option B [a fully integrated peacebuilding mission] or option C 
[the assistance mission recommended by the Secretary-General], with the Council 
split between the two. Dynamics seem to be driven both by the Somali government’s 
support for option B as well as concerns raised by the humanitarian community about 
the risks of structurally integrating the UN Country Team (Security Council Report 
2013). 
The fact that the UN review was mostly UN-internal while the AU review discussed the way 
forward for a military mission in Somalia, is demonstrative in showing that the processes 
lacked coordination. Informant Q (09.02.2013) commented further on this: 
The UN review is really UN-internal. Somebody described it as moving the deck 
chairs on a boat. It is not about Somalia, while the AU review is. 
On 6 March the Security Council adopted a solution most close to option ‘C’. The solution 
did to some extent incorporate the wish of the Somali government to be able to deal with 
‘one’ UN by requesting that the UN Country Team be structurally integrated in the mission 
within January 2014. The humanitarian side was expected to be less happy with this result as 
some feared it would politicize their humanitarian work (What’s in Blue 2013b). However, 
the solution said little about the way forward for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia.  
In the meantime the AU had reacted on the negative response by the UN for a joint mission. 
The AU had instead asked for support for enhancing the AMISOM in line with option B in 
their review. The day before the council meeting 6 March, it was anticipated that the Security 
Council would request the AU to consider providing funding for AMISOM themselves. 
What’s in Blue (2013b) wrote: 
Notably, it seems the draft resolution does not address the AU’s call for the UN to 
authorize an ‘enhancement of the support package’, nor does it respond to the AU’s 
decision in the Peace and Security Council Communiqué of 27 February to broaden 
AMISOM’s mandate to a ‘multidimensional Peace Support Operation’. 
This shows clear incompatibilities between the AU and the UN strategic reviews as this 
attitude does not meet the concerns and demands set out in the AMISOM review where the 
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Review Team clearly asked for a joint mission to be able to deliver a sustained funding for the 
operation.   
The lack of UN willingness to take over a mission after AMISOM, was by several informants 
been credited to the negative experience of the UNISOM II mission, and the memory of the 
18 US soldiers who were killed in 1993. Looking back, former UNISOM II Force 
Commander Bir (2008:47) has written:  
The UN at the time was not ready for such tasks […]. The UN, in short, was not the 
proper organization to manage the large, complex and ambitious operation in 
Somalia. […] Only if the UN acquires the necessary structures might it be able to 
carry out peace enforcement operations. 
Wakengela (2011:387) writes that “it remains to be seen whether the UN will attempt to 
engage directly with the strongest ‘peace spoilers’ in Somalia, al-Shabaab,” or if the UN will 
“passively observe AMISOM’s debacle almost in the same way as it [the UN itself] retreated 
from the country some 14 years ago”. Several informants highlighted that the UN does not 
want to be involved in ‘peace enforcement, which is currently a correct description of the 
mission (Informant K 29.01.2013), and that the UN have been clear in stating that they do not 
want any ‘boots on the ground’ (Informant M 30.01.2013). This view is confirmed by 
Adebajo (2011:175) who writes: “Following the Somali debacle, the administration of US 
president Bill Clinton placed severe restrictions on the approval of future UN missions.” 
While the previous paragraphs have shown that the strategic reviews have suffered from lack 
of coherence along a technical dimension, these statements indicate that there is also more 
lack of coherence along a policy dimension. The discussion in chapter five showed that the 
goals of the actors to a large extent are similar. However, what seems a larger problem is the 
UN’s lack of will to invest further finances or to scarify Western soldiers’ lives in the 
mission. Informant M (30.01.2013) was especially critical in this regard, stating “the UN 
wants to do all the fancy stuff, such as ‘peace building’, leaving the Africans to be killed”. 
The differing reviews present an example of lack of coherence. Because policies are not 
developed in a joint matter the reviews have led to a policy vacuum as they give no answers 
to how a peace enforcement or peacekeeping mission can continue. The apparent agreement 
on the need for coherent policies combined with the lack of coherent results is a reflection of 
what de Coning calls the ‘coherence dilemma’. The process around the two strategic reviews 
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has led to a state of affairs where policies are not pulling in the same direction, and instead of 
developing coherent policies this could endanger the AMISOM mission at a critical time.  
6.2 ‘Traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ donors 
Another example of lack of coherence is related to the ‘non-traditional’ donors; Turkey and 
the Gulf countries. This section argues that the connections between ‘traditional’ and ‘non-
traditional’ donors are too poor, and that this endangers a joint pull of efforts and thus the 
making of coherent policies. The focus here is on relations between Turkey and Western 
actors, while Turkey is said to be the most influential actor in Somalia amongst the states 
which are called ‘non-traditional’ donors.  
All informants mentioned that Turkey in particular and the Gulf-States were becoming 
players to be reckoned with in Somalia. However few had much insight in their policies. One 
diplomat (F 21.01.2013) said: “Turkey has become and wants to be a regional power and play 
a role on the global scene. But we do not know enough about what their goals really are.” 
This statement is worth noticing while Turkey has become a large actor in Somalia. Turkey 
was the first country to reopen an embassy in Mogadishu in 2011, and established itself as a 
strong actor in Somalia after the country provided massive humanitarian aid to Somalia 
during the 2011 East Africa drought. The Turks have also started building infrastructure and 
are doing construction work, such as renovating the international airport and the national 
assembly. Most noteworthy is also the fact that Somali–Turkish relations date back to the 
Middle Ages. This makes Turks oppose the Western label ‘non-traditional donor’. Based on 
the assumption provided in the theory chapter, that coordination increases chances for 
coherence, it seems natural to conclude that other actors should be coordinating with Turkey, 
if the goal is to establish coherent policies.  
One Somali scholar (Informant A 15.01.2013) with links into the current Somali government 
explained that there are hopes of a bilateral defence pact between Turkey and Somalia, and 
that there have been extensive conversations between Turkey and Somalia on a number of 
security political issues. When confronting other actors with this information people would 
neither deny nor confirm the information, as they did not feel they had information enough to 
be certain of an answer. Regardless of the accuracy of the information, this does tell 
something regarding the extent to which information is shared between Turkey and other 
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actors. On question of why the Somali government preferred this cooperation with Turkey, 
the Somali scholar said that Turkey is not pressing on a model, they want to listen to the 
Somalis, and Turkey is a Muslim state that has close historical links to the country. The 
Somali further elaborated that “The government is trying to replicate a more moderate 
Islamism, more moderate than the one al-Shabaab stands for, but not secular and offensive.” 
(Informant A 15.01.2013). Based on this perspective it is possible to argue that cooperation 
with Turkey is not only necessary because it is a substantial actor – it could also provide 
Somalis with some sort of a role model for a moderate Muslim state. Taking the actors’ 
security perspectives and their fear of fundamental Islamism into account, such a role model 
for Somalia would seem advantageous for all actors. Thus, it seems all the more surprising 
that the contact between Turkey and other actors has been so marginal. 
One reason, given for the lack of contact is the fact that Turkey has wanted coordination 
efforts to take place within Somalia while others have preferred such meetings to be held on 
safer grounds. In an anecdote, an informant (J 25.01.2013) explains that during the conference 
for the International Contact Group (ICG) for Somalia in September 2011 a meeting was held 
on the side with the intention of inviting Turkey and the ‘non-traditional donors’ to the table. 
The person who was the EU representative at the time had had come on a bit strong towards 
Turkey in the meeting, and was met with the clear response from the Turkish representative 
who said: “Coordination happens in Mogadishu. We are in Mogadishu. Welcome to 
Mogadishu.” After this statement the Turkish representative stood up and left the room. 
During fieldwork I tried to contact the Turkish embassies in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. 
However, the response given was that the only embassy dealing with Somali affairs was the 
one in Mogadishu. This is in itself a telling fact, as all other actors seem to have at least some 
form of representation in Nairobi – in general this is also their main representation to Somalia. 
By this comment I do not claim that Turkey should be dealing with Somali affairs in Nairobi. 
However, it is worth noting that the literal lack of ‘common ground’ has impeded contact 
among the actors. As Turkey is such a substantial actor inside Somalia and an actor which has 
shown itself to operate on its own terms in its own ways, it seems reasonable to argue that 
lack of contact in this case also implies a great danger for lack of policy coherence. Currently, 
actors are becoming more positive regarding setting up representations inside Somalia. There 
is therefore a possibility that coordination with Turkey will increase. 
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It seems that the challenge of common policy development between the Turkey and Western 
actors is not only one of location, but also one of communication and anticipation. At the last 
Ankara meeting in January 2013 Western diplomats were surprised and caught off guard as 
the Turks chose to come to the table with a proposal for the training of the Somali Security 
Forces, without giving the other representatives enough time to read through and prepare 
themselves for a debate on the matter. As explained by one of the informants, this broke with 
what other actors understood to be diplomatic customs. The reaction of the Western diplomats 
was to push back the suggestion. Informant J (25.01.2013) explains:  
Usually documents are shared in advance. People have to have time to look at it and 
digest. You do not want surprises in the diplomatic circle. […] It is not clear if the 
push-back was because the Turks shared their proposal on the day of the meeting and 
people did not have enough time to digest and consult, or if people were against the 
proposal. 
Regardless of whether actors were sceptical towards the idea that the Turks would take on a 
project for training the Somali Security Forces, or only felt they did not have enough time to 
prepare, the incident does show that there is limited contact or insufficient communication. If 
the international society is to develop coherent policies regarding Somalia it seems essential 
that policies at some level are coordinated with such a substantial actor as the Turkish 
government.  
6.3 Local ownership 
The theory chapter proposes that local ownership is necessary for the development of 
coherent policies, by building on complexity theory and the work of de Coning (2012, 2013). 
This subchapter will discuss whether coherence along a local dimension exists in Somalia, 
and comment on why lack of local ownership can be considered a challenge for policy 
coherence in the Somali case. 
During the fieldwork, criticism was formed concerning the necessity of developing specific 
institutions in Somalia. The critics ask whether the choice to develop certain institutions were 
taken because Somalia needs the institution or whether it was done because everybody 
assumed it was necessary based on an idealized state model. Questions that were asked were: 
Does Somalia really need a constitution? The Brits don’t have one. Does Somalia really need 
an army? Japan has a defence force (Informant J 25.01.2013). Another level of criticism goes 
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deeper and asks whether the entire Western-dominated state-building project in Somalia is 
flawed because the Somali society works on a completely different logic. The consequence of 
this line of thinking is that all state-building efforts by the West in Somalia necessarily will 
fail unless the actors make fundamental changes in their approach. One NGO worker put it 
this way: 
Structural issues inside Somalia will not be resolved by this international intervention 
as it is currently designed. […] We have to accept what the people in Somalia want. 
To a certain extent we are forcing on a European model. […] There are core values 
we should pursue, but the state does not need to be modelled after the one we know. 
By pushing on to Somalia what we have negotiated over centuries in our culture at a 
specific moment in time, we are presenting a technical solution to Somalia which 
might not work (Informant H 24.01.2013). 
The idea that what the West obtained at one point in time cannot be forced into another 
societal system at another point in time is a well-known thought reflected in various research 
papers (see Mair 1997, Nustad 2006). As indicated in the chapter three, this is also a subject 
in complexity theory, as presented by de Coning (2013:4): “The linkage between history, 
culture and institutional legitimacy is, from a Complexity perspective, emergent from the 
local, not derived from the Universal.” Thus, as de Coning notes, an institution or societal 
service as a police service is not a neutral institution that can be replicated in any society.  
Based on the interviews conducted, I would say that the actors studied do seem very aware of 
the fact that Somalia is a society with a specific culture and history which makes the direct 
transfer of any European model to the country complicated, if not impossible. Although actors 
highlight the need to support the new central administration, they all give some weight to the 
need for local initiatives and the need to take features as clan leadership into account. 
However, while opinions were clear when it came to how security sector reform should take 
place – actors became a lot less specific when talking about exactly how local initiatives 
should be formed and how clan leaders should be incorporated into new governance 
structures. Thus, it seems reasonable to ask whether actors at the end of the day will direct 
measures towards stabilization and security in Somalia which is not based on a traditional 
Western way of thinking. The AU and IGAD stand out in this context because they are not 
Western actors. However, they are heavily dependent on funding from Western actors. De 
Coning also reflects upon this matter in his recent ‘Understanding Peacebuilding as 
Essentially Local’, which was published 22 February 2013 after a visit to Mogadishu:  
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Officially everyone claimed to support the Federal Government of Somalia, but in 
reality each outside nation and organization is involved for its own strategic political, 
security and economic needs and interests (de Coning 2013:1).  
De Coning explains that ‘local ownership’ has become a buzz-word for most foreign actors. 
He writes that the word is there in every document “yet no one really expects it to be 
meaningfully pursued” (ibid). These thoughts are much in line with the experiences I myself 
had during the fieldwork, as local ownership was talked of but concrete examples of how it 
were to be pursued seldom were given. In reality the only clear strategy for establishing local 
ownership for the peacebuilding process was to support – at least in speech – the central 
government’s initiatives for local development.  
When promoting ‘local ownership’, a distinction can be drawn between support for the local 
elite’s preferences and institution building at a high level, and the support for more profound 
local initiatives. This is for instance the essence in the difference between a transformation 
argument and an institution-first argument, as proposed by Törnquist (2011:825). It can be 
argued that there are some paradoxes regarding the outspoken support for local, traditional 
initiatives on one side, and the weight put on support for the Mogadishu based government 
and central institution building on the other. The fact that many of the interviewed 
representatives highlighted the need for focus on local processes makes the strong emphasis 
actors put on the current government and building of central institutions seem somewhat 
particular. A ‘dual-track model’, as referred to in chapter 5.3 might seem convincing in 
theory, but the question is what the ‘new’ local track really consists of. An important 
consideration seems to be whether international actors – recognizing the need for an element 
of bottom–up governing in Somalia – should state some clear objectives in this regard. The 
alternative seems to be for international actors to step back and direct all their support through 
the government. This is a difficult debate, because a strong support for bottom–up initiatives 
essentially could undermine the current government; a government which might be the largest 
hope Somalia has had for a long time. Another complicating factor is that such bottom–up 
initiatives could end in a governance structure that most Western states would not identify 
with and thus could have difficulties in accepting. At the same time, it must be said that the 
current government has made substantial promises regarding reaching out to the regions. This 
could be the key fact which explains the great enthusiasm for the current government: The 
new government – with its discourse on reaching out to the regions – facilitates for 
international actors so that these can support a traditional state model and traditional central 
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institution building, while at the same time feeling that the particularity of Somalia is being 
considered and dealt with by the government itself.  The fact that the current government 
itself seems to be genuinely occupied with establishing local legitimate administrations and 
providing basic services to its people must be considered as extremely positive in this 
situation. However, as Carothers (2007:17) comments, elite discourse on democratization and 
outreach to the population must not become a measure which ensures a political elite to hold 
on to power.  
When looking at the local ownership of the Somali elite compared to the international 
community, there is little doubt that the inauguration of the new president in 2012 and the 
following election of a new parliament in many ways represented a shift in the possibilities of 
Somalis to obtain local ownership in policymaking. An indication of this could be said to be 
found at the Core group meeting which took place in Addis Ababa in October 2012. The 
meeting was the first Core group meeting after the inauguration of the new president, and the 
new Somali leadership had a representative present. An EU diplomat (Informant Q 
09.02.2013) explains that people spoke of three interesting statements after the meeting. First, 
one of the central donor nations talked of mutual accountability. This is opposed to before 
when the international society was talking about holding the TFG accountable. “This is 
totally different. The Somali government can now hold the international society responsible, 
as well as the opposite,” explained the informant. Second, the Somali government 
representative who was present had said that whatever happens from now on will be Somali 
led and Somali owned. This also constituted a turn of affairs. Third, the chair of the meeting 
talked of a paradigm shift in the way the international community deal with the situation.  
The approach of the international community towards Somalia [before] was 
incredibly paternalistic, saying; ‘we will tell you how it happens’. I would say 
particularly the UN agencies have had real autonomy to do what they wanted in 
Somalia. In other countries they would need to discuss what they wanted with the 
country’s government. Now they do [in Somalia also]. (Informant Q 09.02.2013).  
The three statements from the Core group meeting are interesting because they together 
highlight the need and urge for a new direction in policymaking where actors will not be able 
to pursue whatever policies they want without consulting with the Somali government. To the 
extent that these statements draw a realistic picture of what future policymaking in and 
towards Somalia should look like, it is a positive sign for the future indicating more 
coherency, based on the assumption that local ownership furthers coherence.  
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However, what becomes a predicament and what should be considered a great concern for the 
execution of local ownership is the fact that international actors are absorbing the time and 
capacity of the government. An example of this is the constant activity which is taking place 
in coordinating bodies and meetings. One diplomat says:  
This is pulling leaders out of Somalia every time. We will hardly see a cancellation of 
the meetings, but it would be good if people could discipline themselves. There is a 
tendency of continued growth of coordinating bodies. (Informant F 21.01.2013, text 
translated).  
In his latest contribution, de Coning (2013:1) expresses a similar view, saying that the 
absorption of Somali capacity is going on even when Somali leaders are not leaving Somalia. 
He writes that:  
The reality is sadly that the limited governing capacity that the President and his 
government have is being overwhelmed by the transaction costs of needing to engage 
with these international actors. Instead of governing Somalia, the President and his 
cabinet are forced to meet with and react to each of the proposals offered by his 
country’s international partners. 
De Coning (ibid) observes that this is a necessity to keep sorely needed resources flowing to 
Somalia, and claims international actors do not recognize the significance of this problem.  
Coherence, as defined through the use of complexity theory, must be said to be lacking in 
Somalia. One important reason for this is, as de Coning (2012:290) supposes, is the lack of 
local ownership. It seems that all actors agree on the need of some kind of local ownership. 
This is in line with de Coning’s (2012, 2013) use of complexity theory, and Törnquist’s 
(2011) transformation argument. However, actors apparent accept for a ‘local ownership 
agenda’ is by critics interpreted as discursive and not leading to practical results. We can 
observe that although international actors have talked of a new willingness to give local 
ownership to the Somali elite, they have no clear strategies or initiatives at play to enhance 
local ownership in the form of genuine local initiatives. At the same time, the government is 
constrained from pursuing such efforts as international actors are taking up time and energy.   
6.4 The coordination assumption 
The theory chapter proposes that frequent coordination between actors will lead to more 
coherence, and calls this the coordination assumption. This section analyzes whether this 
assumption gives explanatory power in the case of policy development in Somalia. 
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Actors engaged in Somalia have been involved in a number of coordinating bodies. One of 
the central coordination bodies is the International Contact Group (ICG) for Somalia, 
originally made up by a small number of central actors such as the United States, the UK and 
Italy. It has now grown to over 40 countries, and a number of international organizations are 
represented as actors in the group. The ICG meets two times a year once in the north and once 
in the region. A Norwegian diplomat (Informant F 21.01.2013) explains that as the group has 
become so big that it has also lost its efficiency. Another coordinating body is the P3+, a 
group made up by three Security Council actors (the US, the UK and France) which has 
expanded to include countries as Italy and the three Scandinavian countries. A more recent 
grouping of interest is the Core group. An EU-diplomat (Q 09.02.2013) explained that the 
Core group initially started as a preparation meeting before the London ICG conference in 
February 2012, a conference which attracted enormous amounts of people. Central actors 
such as the AU, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia met for discussions before the ICG meeting. 
This group has afterwards continued to as an ‘ad on’ at the back of other meetings. There 
have also existed coordinating bodies as the CISS ExCom (Coordination of International 
Support to Somalis Executive Committee) made up by donor countries, the World Bank, and 
the UN Resident Coordinator. The World Bank and the Resident Coordinator have been co-
chairs in this committee which was being closed down at the time when the interview was 
conducted. The Norwegian diplomat also mentioned a donor country coordination organ – the 
Somali Donor Group – where Norway was co-chair in 2012. The United States, the EU, the 
UK through their office DIFID (Department for International Development) and Sweden have 
been co-chairs for the group in recent years.  
This listing shows that there is a range of coordinating bodies at play for which policy 
development towards Somalia is the primary concern. The Norwegian diplomat says:  
There is not lack of international meetings. The ICG just had a meeting in Ankara. The 
Brits are inviting all to a meeting in London in Mai. The EU wants a high level 
meeting in Brussels. (Informant F 21.01.2013, text translated) 
When evaluating policy coherence, one can thus not blame actors for not doing anything to 
coordinate their policies. However, the high number of meeting is apparently not fostering 
results. The diplomat comments: 
Coordination is not good enough. The UN is not even coordinated with itself. There is 
lacking coordination between UNPOS and the UN Country Team for Somalia, and 
there is lacking coordination between the UN and the AU.  
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This comment was reflected in the views of many of the interviewed sources during the 
fieldwork. Most sources were disappointed at the effect of participating in coordinating 
bodies, feeling that discussions in these bodies did not yield results. Sources were also 
generally disappointed by the level of coordination within the UN and between the UN and 
the AU, as noted in section 6.1.  
The acknowledgement that actors have been involved in a range of coordinating bodies poses 
a problem for the coordination assumption. The repeated meetings between actors have not 
led to coherent policy development. Thus, we can conclude that it is not the lack of efforts to 
coordinate which challenges the coherence in actors’ policies. Instead, it seems clear that 
national or even personal interests hinder the development of coherent agendas. During the 
fieldwork one single phrase was repeated again and again from different informants: 
“Everybody wants coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated.” The fact that the 
phrase was pronounced by so many informants, is telling in itself for its reliability. The 
reasons given were simple; to have the lead, to take the credit and to be able to control the 
funding that went into a project was considered to be of value for each actor involved. A few 
informants went as far as claiming there was a certain degree of childish competition between 
the actors. Others mentioned the fact that many employees were based in temporary positions, 
and to be in lead of a project was essential for keeping the money flowing and maybe 
eventually for keeping your job. Thus not only national interest, but also personal interest 
could create obstacles for the development of policies which are pulling in the same direction. 
However, the case of Turkey shows that although efforts at coordination do not seem to be 
sufficient for the development of coherent policies, it seems reasonable to argue that 
coherence is more likely to occur if policies are coordinated. One might even consider it as a 
necessary variable. According to De Coning and Friis (2011:271) coordination can provide a 
space for coherence to emerge. They hold that actors who “enter into a meaningful 
comprehensive relationship, will tend to form a coherent core”. 
Another reason given for the lack of successful coordination is that coordination is taking 
place outside Somalia, away from the local realities. From the perspective of complexity 
theory, coordination from within Somalia is more desirable as this will further the possibilities 
for establishing local ownership over the coordinating process. A positive factor in this regard 
is that more and more actors now are considering establishing representations in Mogadishu 
(Informant F 21.01.2013).  
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6.5 National interest revisited 
Realist theory argues that states need to rely on their own capabilities, their power, to achieve 
international goals (Glaser 2010:17). In this sense realism sees national security as ‘high 
politics’ and as the state’s primary interest (Glaser 2010:20). According to such a view 
establishing coherent foreign security policies towards a country like Somalia is not only 
difficult because actors might have different interests, but possibly also unachievable because 
there may be little reason for actors to cooperate. According to Waltz, cooperation is not an 
attractive solution, because what counts is ‘relative gains’ (Glaser 2010:21). However, there 
are also other perspectives on which factors should be deemed as ‘high politics’. In the late 
70s, Keohane and Nye (1977:24-26) argued that economic politics had become ‘high 
politics’, because of the mutual interdependence amongst nations made military measures of 
less use. Matlary (2009) argues that public opinion in member states is vital for which foreign 
policy action that is taken in her book European Union Security Dynamics: In the new 
national Interest. Using intergovernmental theory on two-level games, she believes that 
domestic policies ultimately can be decisive for the action taken by multinational institutions 
such as the EU. Intergovernmental theory can also be connected to debates on burden-sharing 
as described by Hallams and Scheer (2012). This debate highlights that a decisive factor in 
policymaking is actors’ will to take the burden, when several actors gain on the 
implementation of a policy. Thus, the debate on burden-sharing shows that an actor’s self-
interest is not only related to security: self-interest can also entail avoiding financial burdens 
or loss of good-will from the opinion at home.  
This section of the thesis argues that both economic burden-sharing and media coverage is 
influencing the contributions by single states and organizations, and that fluctuations actors’ 
priorities can lead to unsustainable policies towards Somalia causing less coherence in 
policies. However, this subchapter also argues – in line with thought which gives primary 
significance to national security – that a decisive factor for these fluctuations is the 
developments inside Somalia where al-Shabaab no longer constitute a major threat. As actors 
are profoundly guided by their security interest, the positive developments in Somalia have 
caused some actors to consider reducing their engagement.  
Chapter five highlights that although security perspectives amongst actors in Somalia are 
similar, actors have one main factor in common which splits them: that of national or self-
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interest. The chapter shows that Somalia has been considered to be of importance to national 
security by influential actors like the United States and the EU. Figuratively speaking, we 
could say that Somalia was placed at an elevated point on a ‘high low’ policy scale. What 
happens then, when these threats are no longer as substantial as before?  
Statements by elite informants indicate that the so far successful – although not complete – 
defeat of al-Shabaab has firm implications for the prospects of further involvement by a key 
actor as the United States. A US diplomat (Informant N 31.01.2013) stated that there is a 
sense of fatigue amongst both Americans and Europeans, and that people are asking 
themselves of when they will be done: 
In some ways good news are bad news. We have reached the end of the transition in 
Somalia. There is a handful guys left in al-Shabaab that we worry about in regard to 
reaching out to Europe and North America. If these are arrested or killed, I can see it; 
people will be saying ‘ok, next challenge’. I hope that will not happen, but there is an 
understandable fatigue. People are waiting for the point when we can say, ok – things 
are on the right track.  
This quote clearly shows that perceptions of national security and national interest are of high 
significance when it comes to international engagement in Somalia. This creates an uncertain 
image of which significance actors will put into following up the situation in Somalia – for 
example in matters relating to human security – when the threat to Western countries’ 
national security is eliminated. This insecurity also implies an insecurity regarding which 
policies will be developed or implemented. 
However, it is not only the scaling down of Somalia as an international threat that creates 
uncertainties about further involvement. Other substantial factors are the rescaling of 
priorities and the cost in money, time and personnel that are brought on by other ‘competing’ 
challenges posed by Islamists gaining ground in Africa. When speaking of the fatigue in the 
international community regarding Somalia, the US diplomat stated: “Mali accelerates this 
process.” He further explained: “In the US we say there is ‘the Washington Post effect’. The 
newspaper drives the conversation” (Informant N 31.01.2013). While Mali has been creating 
headlines in debate-setting newspapers time and again the last months, Somalia has received 
less attention. A quick search on the Norwegian newspaper database Retriever shows that 
during the two months from 11
 
January 2013 to 11
 March 2013 ‘Mali’ is mentioned in the 
title in 505 articles while ‘Somalia’ appears 41 times in a title. This fact might not be a 
surprise as the developments in Mali in this period were substantial. However the point is, in 
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line with the view of the US diplomat, that political pressures and debates concerning Mali 
risks driving Somalia – as a subject of debate – into the shadows. Other diplomats were 
supporting this view making statements such as: “People are saying; now we need to move on 
and think about Mali” (Informant Q 09.02.2013). What the informant calls ‘the Washington 
Post effect’ fits well with Matlary’s understanding of ‘the new national interest’, because it 
highlights how the public opinion can have an influence on policymaker’s decisions.  Matlary 
(2009:74) explains this interest as a consequence of actors’ interest in conducting policies 
which are legitimate in the eyes of the public opinion.   
Adding on the fact that the public and politicians are directing their attention towards Mali is 
the issue of time and personnel spent, and the economic funding of the operations. The US 
diplomat (Informant N 31.01.2013) explained the realisms of prioritizing African crises:  
There are a number of donor meetings, and how much time is there for Somalia and 
Mali? Some say you can only be occupied with two African crises at the time. The 
third drops of the chart. Now we have North Africa, Mali and Somalia.  
During the fieldwork I personally experienced some of these effects: scheduled interviews 
were rescheduled and cancelled because of upcoming and spontaneous Mali meetings on 
three occasions, and I also spoke to a diplomat whom had experienced that a meeting was 
cancelled for the same reason. When the actors are faced with a new crisis, time necessarily 
becomes a shortage. 
The same can be said about finances. One diplomat said:  
Mali will maybe cost a billion dollars a year. This is money that needs to be 
reprioritized from other expenses. This could mean less to others. This is a potential 
danger [for Somalia] with Mali (Informant P 01.02.2013). 
Of the pure financial contributors to Somalia, the EU stands out as it has provided the large 
share of direct financial funding to AMISOM through the African Peace Facility. However, 
all actors are aware that there the official EU funding for AMISOM will not last much longer. 
One EU diplomat (Informant M 30.01.2013) explained the dilemma of continued support for 
AMISOM which has been absorbing the major share of the Peace Facility which is also 
intended for other African crisis:  
We will run out of money to AMISOM by the end of March, and we have reserves to 
July. […] We will contribute to Mali 50 million initially. We will contribute to the 
South African Republic, and we have a request from Congo. Mali is making the 
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headlines, and one of our member states [France] is actively involved. AMISOM 
needs an alternative because we cannot sustain it anymore. 
While this quote highlights which financial consequences the operations in Mali have for 
Somalia, another EU diplomat (Informant Q 09.02.2013) underlines that Mali is not the only 
reason for the reduced EU funding for Somalia in the future: “Even if Mali hadn’t come up 
AMISOM is becoming so expensive that we do not have it [the money] anyway.” The lack of 
sustained funding for AMISOM is further complicated by the lack of clarity and cohesion in 
the AU and UN strategic reviews. An alternative where the UN took over the mission would 
provide a solution to the financial problems for the mission. However, the fact than the UN 
does not want to take on the mission or enter into a joint structure, will according to the 
AMISOM strategic review report lead to a situation which is not sustainable (AMISOM 
Strategic Review Team 2013:ii). When Somalia represents less of a threat than before and 
large contributions are made elsewhere this further complicates the project of establishing a 
clear and coherent option for a future peacekeeping or peace enforcing mission in Somalia. At 
the same time, all representatives from the United States, the EU, the UN, the AU and IGAD 
that were interviewed during fieldwork agreed that AMISOM is still needed for some time in 
Somalia. This complex situation resembles dilemmas referred to in the literature as burden-
sharing, where actors who agree on goals will disagree on who is to finance and provide other 
services in an operation (see Hallams and Schreer 2012). As demonstrated in section 6.1, the 
problem of burden-sharing relating to the continuance of a peace enforcing mission in 
Somalia can be seen not only as a financial problem, but also as a matter of who are to place 
soldiers’ lives on the line for a common cause. 
Financial burden-sharing problems are not only affecting coherent policy development in the 
case of AMISOM. One EU diplomat (Informant C 17.01.2013) highlights that the same 
problem emerges in the case of the development of the Somali Security Forces (SSF): 
The AMISOM exit option must involve a timetable for the handover to Somali Security 
Forces. A key issue here is to pay their [the SSF’s] salaries. At the moment the US is 
the main contributor and Italy is paying, but it is not enough. People are still not 
getting their salaries. Either they are not paid enough or they are not paid regularly. 
This leads to a situation where one cannot trust the loyalty of the security forces. 
The diplomat further explains how also legal frameworks can present a complicating factor: 
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According to rules and regulations the EU cannot pay salaries for third countries’ 
armies. We can pay the police, but not the armies. We can train armies, but we cannot 
pay them. However, single states, as Italy, can.   
This shows that not only burden-sharing but also legal frameworks can influence 
policymaking and ultimately have significance for international policy coherence. 
Two conclusions can be drawn regarding the significance of national or self-interests for 
policymaking: First, it is beyond doubt that national or self-interest is a significant factor in 
policymaking. This was shown in the analysis in chapter five, where it was established that 
actors’ initial involvement in Somalia was based on self-interest. The chapter also showed 
that while all actors are steered by self-interest this does not necessarily lead to differing 
policy goals among actors. However, the weight of self-interest can lead to difficulties in 
burden-sharing amongst actors, as is shown through the example of the difficulties in 
establishing who should bear the financial burden for a peace enforcing mission in Somalia, 
and who should place their soldiers at disposal. These burden-sharing dilemmas can cause 
lack of coherent policymaking, as is shown in the case of the AU and UN strategic reviews.  
Second, we can conclude that changes in actors’ priorities – caused by change in physical 
circumstances – are likely to influence coherence. Added up, the situation which portrays 
itself is a complex pattern of wishes and demands. Economic considerations are weighed 
against the urgency of the Somali ‘threat’. This is topped by changes in priorities caused by 
the Mali situation. The urgency of Mali itself can be further exacerbated through ‘The 
Washington Post effect’ and maybe also influenced by the fact that France, a substantial actor 
in the EU and within the P3, has particular and stronger interests in Mali. This creates 
uncertainty around the genuine engagement of actors in Somalia in the future. The EU says 
they are fatigued, the United States says attention is going elsewhere as Somalia is no longer 
an urgent threat. The UN is constrained by the interests of the P3 members. When the 
sustainability of the international engagement is put into question, there is risk of a policy 
vacuum where it is not clear in which direction efforts will be pulling. The lack of clarity 
regarding the continuation of a peace enforcing or peacekeeping mission in Somalia can be 




This thesis has analysed the security perspectives and policies of five major foreign actors 
engaged in Somalia: the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, 
the European Union, the United States and the United Nations. The overarching research 
question was divided into two parts. It first asked: To what extent do international actors 
involved in Somalia have similar security perspectives? and secondly: What are the main 
challenges in achieving a coherent international policy towards Somalia?  
This chapter sums up the main empirical findings and the theory-oriented reflections they 
have triggered. The first two sections respectively answer the two parts of the research 
question, while section 7.1.3 reflects on the combined findings. Section 7.2 confronts the 
choice of theory and indicates some generalizable conclusions we can draw from this case 
study. The last section offers some reflections on the future.  
7.1 Main findings 
This thesis has shown that while international actors engaged in Somalia have quite similar 
security perspectives, and while there is a will to coordinate, there is still a lack of coherence 
in international policymaking. To some extent, this lack of coherence can be attributed to lack 
of local ownership in policymaking. However, this is not sufficient to explain the lack of 
coherence in all cases. Significance must also be given to actors’ self-interests, and within this 
the problems of burden-sharing and changes in actors’ priorities.    
7.1.1 A similar security perspective 
Security perspective was defined as an actor’s view on what constitutes a threat to security, 
what the principal object to be secured is, and by which measures it is to be secured. Looking 
at the goals actors pursue in Somalia, the measures they emphasize and the referent objects 
they address, we have seen striking similarity in actors’ perspectives. As shown in section 5.1, 
their engagement in Somalia is fundamentally influenced by the perception that the instability 
in the country constitutes a danger to their own security or that of their member states. In this 
way each actor itself is a referent object. However, actors pursue the security of multiple 
referent objects through their stated goals for Somalia and the measures they emphasize. Most 
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notably, they pursue state security through their goals and the measures they apply. However, 
in a state like Somalia there is a thin dividing line between state security and regime security. 
Some significance is accorded to the Somali population as a referent object, but in many ways 
the pursuit of human security seem to have secondary status among the actors studied.  
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 analysed actors’ security perspectives in terms of their pursuit of goals in 
Somalia and the choice of measures. The analysis showed that actors’ pursuits inside Somalia 
largely fit the framework of the ‘institutions first’ approach, which focuses on the need to 
establish strong institutional bodies and rule of law before seeking to introduce more 
democratic processes, such as the holding of general elections. This prioritization strengthens 
the security of the state and the regime – but it cannot be said to give primary importance to 
the human being as a referent object.  
Actors’ security perspectives were shown to be similar, but two modifications should be 
noted. First, actors are primarily involved in Somalia on the basis of their own self-interest. 
Although this self-interest does not lead the various actors to pursue goals within Somalia that 
are substantially different, the self-interest of each actor is necessarily specific to that actor 
and therefore represents a differentiating factor. Secondly, there are differences within the 
international community as to how al-Shabaab is perceived. Informants give differing 
explanations as to what or who al-Shabaab is: some describe the group as having an 
international core, whereas others see it as a genuinely Somali phenomenon. This difference 
has important ramifications. The first perception implies that one cannot negotiate with al-
Shabaab; but seeing the group as a genuinely Somali phenomenon implies the opposite. Given 
a historical view, the conflict with al-Shabaab, or militant Islamism in Somalia in general, 
cannot be resolved in any other way than through negotiations. The greatest differences in 
perceptions here were found between the actors analysed and informants from civil society. 
However, an informant from the UN also raised concerns regarding the blacklisting of the 
group which in practice makes it impossible for either the UN or civil society actors to 
attempt to reach out to al-Shabaab.  
7.1.2 Lack of policy coherence 
Coherence was defined as a situation where actors in the international system operate and 
develop policies so that efforts pull in the same direction. Initially, two dimensions were 
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attributed to the concept: a policy dimension and a technical dimension. Through the use of 
complexity theory, a third dimension was added – the local dimension.  
The case of the AU and UN strategic reviews shows that organizations are not able to 
overcome financial difficulties and self-interest to develop a mutual solution which can ensure 
a sustained peace-enforcing or peacekeeping force in Somalia. The case demonstrates a clear 
lack of coherence along both the technical and the policy dimensions. The lack of will on the 
part of the UN to engage peacekeepers on the ground in Somalia is incoherent with the AU 
policy of seeking a joint mission or a handover to the UN. There was also incoherence along 
the technical dimension, as the UN Security Council held a decisive meeting on the UN report 
even before the AU report had been submitted. The two organizations have not proven 
capable of finding a solution to the financial problems relating to a continued mission. In 
addition, the lack of constructive dialogue between ‘traditional’ and ‘untraditional’ donors 
gives rise to the question of whether coherence can be said to have been achieved when an 
influential actor like Turkey is operating on its own premises, without substantial contact with 
Western actors or Western coordinating bodies. These cases suggest that coherence in some 
cases may be substantially weakened as a result of poor coordination between actors. This is 
the case when lack of coordination leads to a policy vacuum, as in the case of the strategic 
reviews. It is also the case when lack of coordination leads to lack of substantial contact with, 
or understanding of, an important actor – as in the case of Turkey.  
The use of complexity theory implies a widening of the coherence concept, and an 
incorporation of a third dimension: local ownership. Complexity theory suggests that 
coherence should be understood as the pursuit of an “optimal level of cooperation among 
agents in a given context” (de Coning 2013:4). Such a use of the concept thus implies that 
what is optimal will be determined by the specific context. Opinion differs on whether the 
Somalis have ‘enough’ local ownership over the ongoing process in the country. While 
optimists claim times are better than ever, sceptics hold that ‘local ownership’ is used only as 
discourse or a ‘buzzword’ and that the country is undergoing changes based on Western 
conceptions and models. The criticisms can be separated into two levels: the belief that the 
Somali government itself lacks autonomy in its relations with international actors, and the 
belief that the initiatives in general are too centrally focused and not sufficiently local. The 
fact that few actors spoke of specific goals in creating a ‘second’, local policy track supports 
the assumption that there is lack of local ownership in the second sense. This can be seen not 
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only as a challenge for coherence – it is also questionable from a transformation perspective 
of how genuine democratic governance can be achieved.   
In considering the coordination assumption, this thesis has shown that the coordination 
between influential actors cannot in itself be deemed sufficient for establishing coherent 
policies. This is demonstrated by the fact that numerous coordinating bodies have been 
established, and yet all informants expressed disappointment regarding the outputs of these. 
Building on the case of Turkey, it could be argued that coordination will increase the chances 
of coherent policies – but it does not seem sufficient for establishing them.  
National interest or self-interest was mentioned by informants when explaining why actors 
who favour coordination do not want to be coordinated. It was also given consideration in the 
case of the lack of coherence in the AU and UN strategic reviews, as the UN’s lack of interest 
in a UN mission in Somalia derives primarily from the Western countries’ unwillingness to 
risk the lives of Western soldiers. The case of the reviews shows that burden-sharing 
dilemmas can arise between actors who have the same goals but who consider the financial 
costs of a mission to be too high. This suggests that self-interest is a significant factor which 
can hinder the development of coherent policies.  
Given that self-interest is of importance, we should also consider the implications that 
changes in actors’ priorities have for coherence in policymaking. The analysis has shown that 
changes in the physical environment, inside Somalia and in Mali, have led actors to change 
priorities according to what they see as their highest interests. This can serve as a further 
destabilizing factor that influences policy coherence.    
7.1.3 The significance of self-interest and local ownership 
The analysis has shown that the initial assumption of this thesis – that similar security 
perspectives would lead to greater policy coherence and vice versa – was incorrect. Two 
factors in particular can explain why similar security perspectives are not sufficient to ensure 
policy coherence.  
The first explanation has a basis in theory. Building on complexity theory, one can argue that 
coherence will always be lacking if there is not sufficient local attachment. The fact that 
substantial international actors share a security perspective will thus not be sufficient for 
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coherence. What ‘counts’, for coherence, is whether the policy is context-specific and based 
on local ownership. Based on this explanation, the discrepancy in the findings should come as 
no surprise because the first part of this thesis studied perspectives at the international level, 
whereas coherence, according to complexity theory, is dependent on the local level. 
The second explanation can be given independently of whether one assumes that coherence as 
a concept should have a local dimension. This explanation sees self-interest as fundamental in 
determining an actor’s policies. Self-interest is decisive not only because it determines the 
actors’ initial and general involvement; it is also of central importance when actors are to 
share burdens amongst themselves through intergovernmental or inter-actor negotiations and 
talks. Even if actors primarily have a shared perspective, it is therefore difficult to decide on 
substantial policies which will involve that someone can take the credit, someone must pay 
the financial costs and someone must sacrifice soldiers’ lives. The case of limited success in 
coordinating the AU and UN strategic reviews and the lack of coherence in peace-making and 
peacekeeping policies which this implied is an illustrative example of this.  
7.2 Confronting the choice of theory  
In this thesis I have shown how theory on security can be used to operationalize actors’ 
security perspectives, and facilitate for comparative analysis of actors’ policies. Although 
initially intending to analyse the possible link between actors’ security perspectives and 
coherence in policymaking, I must conclude that I found no such causal relationship in the 
case of Somalia, and that lack of policy coherence is caused by other factors. Thus, my choice 
of using security theory to inform challenges of coherence did not provide the necessary 
analytical tool.  
However, this process did reveal information of significance in terms of theory. The presence 
of similar security perspectives, implying that actors had common objectives for Somalia, 
combined with lacking coherence in policymaking, resembles ‘the coherence dilemma’ as 
described by de Coning (2012). While de Coning shows that complexity theory, with its 
weight on local ownership, can explain the coherence dilemma, I argue that actors’ self-




The study can to some extent be used to draw contingent generalizations. Such 
generalizations can be made towards cases where international actors are engaged in 
policymaking in countries with security problems that affect national as well as international 
security. First, we can conclude that the existence of differing national interests does not 
necessarily mean that actors will pursue different goals inside the host country. Next, we can 
say that even if the security perspectives are equal, this will not necessarily lead to coherent 
policies. Reasons for this can be the lack of local attachment in policy development, or it can 
be the significance of self-interest. Self-interest can influence actors so that they hold back on 
funding, refuse to put personnel on the ground in the country, or simply cause actors to shift 
their priorities and divert the focus and resources away from the state in question.   
7.3 Concluding reflections 
Somalia is at a crossroads. Many have described the situation as a ‘window of opportunity’. 
Among my informants, a substantial majority expressed that they had more hope than ever for 
the country. In this situation, calls for local ownership have become strong. However, a turn 
in circumstances where international actors withdraw completely from engagement in 
Somalia seems highly unlikely. This suggests that we must accept the reality that international 
actors will remain involved at some level, and must work on developing local ownership to 
the process. In many ways, it is important to support the new central administration. However, 
it should be clear that supporting the current government should not imply designing the form 
of governance and administration. Neither should it mean ignoring the fact that there are 
entities and regions in Somalia not entirely comfortable with the central administration at 
present. A reasonable approach would seem to be to support government efforts to reach out 
to local communities with basic services and to build local legitimate administrations. It is 
also important to support dialogue between the different levels of society, always bearing in 
mind that Somalis should have some type of local ownership over this process as well. One 
step in this direction is the ‘dual-track approach’, which implies recognition at a certain level 
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Questions measuring security perspectives: 
 
Main questions: 
1. How is the problem defined: what is the over-all main concern that the actor has 
regarding Somalia? 
2. What are the main goals that the actor seeks to achieve through its presence? 
3. Which measures does the actor want to apply? 
4. How is al-Shabaab perceived? 
5. Who or what is being secured through the actor’s policies?  
 
Additional questions: 
6. When did the actor become involved? 
7. Why did the actor become involved at this time? 
8. How long will the actor be involved? 
9. When AMISOM eventually draws out – what is needed to follow up? 
10. Who will provide this support? 
11. Which engagement does the actor see for itself in relation to Somalia in the future? 
 
Questions measuring coherence: 
1. Are there political or structural contradictions which impede coherent policymaking?  
2. Are there financial or logistical contradictions which impede coherent policymaking? 
3. To what extent is are you as an organization/state coordinated with others? 
4. Are there institutionalized meetings between your organization/state and others? 




6. Which role does the actor see for Somali clans in the future?  
7. Does the actor have a position regarding Jubaland? 
8. What is the actor’s vision of Somalia’s future state (centralized/federalized)? 
9. Is the governmental system in Puntland a model for the future? 
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